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MANAGING CYBERTHREAT
Lawrence J. Trautman†
Cybersecurity is an important strategic and governance issue.
However, most corporate CEOs and directors have no formal
engineering or information technology training, which leads to a
problematic lack of actual cybersecurity knowledge. Particularly in
smaller companies with limited resources, knowledge regarding what
their enterprise should actually be doing about cybersecurity isn’t all
that good.
My goal in this article is to explore the unusually complex subject
of cybersecurity in a highly readable manner. First, I provide an
examination of recent threats. Next, I discuss governmental policy
initiatives. Third, I offer some basic tools that can be used by boards
and top management to improve the quality of discussions with their
information technology executives. It is likely that most top
management and corporate directors have never heard of, let alone
read: the SANS Critical Security Controls; OWASP Top Ten;
CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors; Presidential
Executive Order 13636 (& Treasury Dept. Report); Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review; or NIST Framework. By offering
suggestions about what top managers and boards can do to improve
organizational cybersecurity awareness and readiness, this paper
makes a worthwhile contribution to the literature of risk management
and provides meaningful progress in strengthening the knowledge base
and ability of top management and boards to govern enterprise
cybersecurity.
† B.A., The American University; M.B.A., The George Washington University; postgraduate studies (Management Information Systems) University of Texas at Dallas; and J.D.,
Oklahoma City University School of Law. Mr. Trautman is Assistant Professor of Business Law
and Ethics at Western Carolina University and a past president of the Dallas Internet Society and
the New York and Metropolitan Washington/Baltimore Chapters of the National Association of
Corporate Directors. He may be reached at Lawrence.J.Trautman@gmail.com. The author wishes
to extend particular thanks to the following for their assistance in the research and preparation of
this article: Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN (Retired), Former Director of the National Security
Agency (NSA) and Deputy Director of U.S. Central Intelligence; Scott Godes, Gary J. Fernandes,
Stuart Malawer, Thomas M. Nealon, Arun Sood, James C. Wetherbe, and, in particular, Frederick
R. Chang. All errors and omissions are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity is an important strategic and governance issue.1
However, most corporate CEOs and directors have no formal
engineering or information technology training, which leads to a
problematic lack of actual cybersecurity knowledge. Particularly in
smaller companies with limited resources, knowledge regarding what
their enterprise should actually be doing about cybersecurity isn’t all
that good.
Speaking at the New York Stock Exchange “Cyber Risks and the
Boardroom” Conference, SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar stated
that “[o]ver just a relatively short period of time, cybersecurity has
become a top concern of American companies, financial institutions,
law enforcement, and many regulators.”2 Observing that “[l]aw
1. See generally Susan P. Crawford, First Do No Harm: The Problem of Spyware, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1433 (2005) (discussing spyware legislation); Urs Gasser & Daniel M.
Häusermann, E-Compliance: Towards a Roadmap for Effective Risk Management, (Mar. 15,
2007), THE BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL § 3,
(2007), (discussing internet risk management and maps a comprehensive e-compliance strategy);
Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information
Technology Governance, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313, 314 (2011) (sounding an
alarm about the escalating cybersecurity threats facing management of every enterprise addresses
a director’s “role in the risk oversight of the corporations they serve, their role in governance of
IT, a director’s role in mitigating IT risks, and ways in which that risk can be transferred to or
shared with others”), http://bit.do/BoardResponsibilityforITGovernance; Jonathan Zittrain, The
Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1974-80 (2006), (a pioneering work discussing
software vulnerabilities).
2. Corporate Governance and Cyber Risks: Sharpening the Focus, Address Hearing
Before the New York Stock Exchange, Conference on “Cyber Risks and the Boardroom,” (2014)
(Statement of Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Boards of
Directors) (“For example, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), James
Comey, said last November that ‘resources devoted to cyber-based threats will equal or even
eclipse
the
resources
devoted
to
non-cyber
based
terrorist
threats.’”),
http://bit.do/CorpGovernanceCyberRisks; Protecting Your Personal Data: How Law

2016]

MANAGING CYBERTHREAT

233

enforcement and financial regulators have stated publicly that cyberattacks are becoming both more frequent and more sophisticated,”3
Commissioner Aguilar warned that “cyber-attacks have become
increasingly costly to companies that are attacked. According to one
2013 survey, the average annualized cost of cybercrime to a sample of
U.S. companies was $11.6 million per year, representing a 78%
increase since 2009.”4 Particularly alarming are survey research results
of senior decision-makers among the largest companies in 59 countries
indicating that nearly fifty percent of respondents “see cybercrime as a

Enforcement Works With The Private Sector To Prevent Cybercrime: Hearing before the House
Comm. on Homeland Sec’y, Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Prot., and Sec’y Tech.,
113th Cong. (2014) (written testimony of Ari Baranoff, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, United
States Secret Service Criminal Investigative Division) (“Advances in computer technology and
greater access to personally identifiable information (PII) via the Internet have created online
marketplaces for transnational cyber criminals to share stolen information and criminal
methodologies. As a result, the Secret Service has observed a marked increase in the quality,
quantity, and complexity of cybercrimes targeting private industry and critical infrastructure.”),
http://bit.do/ProtectingPersonalData; Threats to the Homeland: Hearing before the Senate Comm.
on Homeland Sec’y and Gov’t Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of James B. Comey, Jr.,
Director, FBI, U.S. Department of Justice), http://bit.do/ThreatsToHomeland; see also House
Comm. on Homeland Sec’y, 114 Cong. (2014) (statement of Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security) (“DHS must continue efforts to address the growing cyber
threat to the private sector and the ‘.gov’ networks, illustrated by the real, pervasive, and ongoing
series of attacks on public and private infrastructure.”), http://bit.do/JehJohnsonStatement;
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta to the Business Executives for National
Security (Oct. 11, 2012) (“As director of the CIA and now Secretary of Defense, I have understood
that cyber attacks are every bit as real as the more well-known threats like terrorism, nuclear
weapons proliferation and the turmoil that we see in the Middle East. And the cyber threats facing
this country are growing.”), http://bit.do/RemarksByLeonPanetta.
3. Corporate Governance and Cyber Risks, supra note 2; for example, on December 9,
2013, the Financial Stability Oversight Council held a meeting to discuss cybersecurity threats to
the financial system. See U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release, Financial Stability
Oversight Council to Meet December 9 (2013), http://bit.do/FinancialStabilityOversight. During
that meeting, Assistant Treasury Secretary Cyrus-Amir-Mokri said that “[o]ur experience over
the last couple of years shows that cyber-threats to financial institutions and markets are growing
in both frequency and sophistication.” See Remarks of Assistant Secretary Cyrus Amir-Mokri on
Cybersecurity at a Meeting of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Dec. 9,
2013), http://bit.do/CyrusAmir-MokriRemarks. In addition, in testimony before the House
Financial Services Committee in 2011, the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Cyber Division stated
that the number and sophistication of malicious incidents involving financial institutions has
increased dramatically over the past several years and offered numerous examples of such attacks,
which included fraudulent monetary transfers, unauthorized financial transactions from
compromised bank and brokerage accounts, denial of service attacks on U.S. stock exchanges,
and hacking incidents in which confidential information was misappropriated. See U.S. House,
House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit, 112 Cong. (statement of Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Cyber Division, FBI, U.S.
Department of Justice) (2011), http://bit.do/GordonSnowStatement.
4. HP Press Release, HP Reveals Cost of Cybercrime Escalates 70 Percent, Time to
Resolve Attacks More Than Doubles (Oct. 8, 2013), http://bit.do/HPRevealsCostOfCybercrime.
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very or fairly low risk to their business.”5 In addition, seventy-four
percent of these mostly non-U.S. respondents “whose business had
been breached stated that the breach had not been publicly disclosed.”6
One estimate is that “cybercrime costs the United States approximately
$100 billion annually.”7
Top management and corporate directors are busy people.
Competing demands for the time and attention of corporate directors
include: all the preparation work required by committee assignments
(such as audit, compensation, nominating and governance); key top
management succession planning; the need to absorb complex
information from a company’s financial statements; a reading load that
includes important internal documents; compliance issues; strategy
efforts; mandatory regulatory exposure areas (such as Dodd-Frank,
Sarbanes-Oxley, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); necessary visits
to company facilities; awareness and discussion of major financing
issues; and ongoing ad hoc crisis management.8 In addition, some
directors serve as CEO of another organization and may serve as a
director of more than one board.9 Given this environment, developing
a sophisticated awareness of cybersecurity issues is a challenge for
those having significant competing responsibilities.
My goal in this article is to explore the unusually complex subject
of cybersecurity in a highly readable manner. First, I provide an
examination of recent threats. Next, I discuss governmental policy
initiatives. Third, I offer some basic tools that can be used by boards
and top management to improve the quality of discussions with their
information technology executives. At this point, it is likely that most
top management and corporate directors have never heard of, let alone
read: the SANS Critical Security Controls; OWASP Top Ten;
5. EY, Overcoming Compliance Fatigue: Reinforcing the Commitment to Ethical
Growth, 13th Global Fraud Survey, at 4 (2014) (based on 2,719 interviews of senior decision
makers in 59 countries and territories between November 2013 and February 2014),
http://bit.do/OvercomingComplianceFatigue.
6. Id. See also Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and
Officers’ Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, (Dec. 10, 2016); Lawrence J.
Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Stuxnet and the
Internet of Things (IoT) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
7. Mitchell S. Kominsky, The Current Landscape of Cybersecurity Policy: Legislative
Issues in the 113th Congress, HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. (Feb. 6, 2014),
http://bit.do/LandscapeOfCybersecurityPolicy.
8. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for
Director Selection and Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75 (2012) [hereinafter Matrix];
Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis Governance, 13 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. __ (2016).
9. Id.
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CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors; Presidential
Executive Order 13636 (& Treasury Dept. Report); Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review; or the NIST Framework. Hopefully, these
suggestions about what top managers and boards can do to improve
cyber awareness and readiness will result in meaningful progress
toward strengthening cybersecurity governance.
It is understandable that directors in many boardrooms wonder
“How can I be expected to govern something I know so little about?”10
The complex modern environment in which data resides serves to
complicate the issues surrounding governance of cyber risk. Serving as
the SEC’s inaugural Director of the Division of Risk, Strategy, and
Financial Innovation (2009-2011), Professor Henry T.C. Hu,
concluded that “modern financial innovation has resulted in objective
realities that are far more complex than in the past, often beyond the
capacity of the English language, accounting terminology, visual
display, risk measurement, and other tools on which all depictions must
primarily rely.”11 Professor Hu further observed that “such
characteristics can be so complex that even ‘objective reality’ is subject
to multiple meanings.”12 Significant additional costs may result from
litigation stemming from potential liability exposure.13 Professor
Frederick Chang observes:
Cyber infrastructure is tightly woven into the very fabric of our lives and it
would be very hard to imagine going back to an earlier time ̶ but we are
paying a heavy price for our technological dependence, and the problem is
worsening with the passage of time. Our trust in cyberspace has been taken
from us by hackers, cybercriminals and sophisticated cyber attackers who
intend to do us harm . . . We expect that it should not be impossibly difficult
to protect ourselves in cyberspace if/when the need arises. These
expectations are simply not being met today. Attacks on both the public
10. See Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1, at 313 (citing Peter Weill and Jeanne
W. Ross (depicting Information Technology as one of the “six key assets for any enterprise” (the
others being human, physical, financial, intellectual property and relationships)). See PETER
WEILL & JEANNE W. ROSS, IT GOVERNANCE: HOW TOP PERFORMERS MANAGE IT DECISIONS
RIGHTS FOR SUPERIOR RESULTS 6 (2004) (Peter Weill, Director of the Center for Information
Systems Research (“CISR”) and Senior Research Scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s Sloan School of Management led research during 2001-2003, which studied 256
enterprises in Europe, Asia Pacific and the Americas. During the same general time period,
parallel studies were conducted by Jeanne Ross and Cynthia Beath at the University of Texas).
11. Henry T.C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, ‘Pure Information,” and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 1601, 1602 (2012) (describing the environment of risk
inherent in complex financial instruments associated with and subsequent to the 2008-2009 global
financial crisis).
12. Id.
13. See generally Kevin M. Gatzlaff & Kathleen A. McCullough, The Effect of Data
Breaches on Shareholder Wealth, 13 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 61 (2010).
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sector and the private sector are rampant. Denial of service, identity theft,
and cyber extortion are now all too common . . . financial systems, national
critical infrastructure systems, defense systems, and much more are all
targets of sophisticated cyber attacks.14

I. THREATS ESCALATE
Mike McConnell, Booz Allen Hamilton Vice Chairman and
former U.S. Director of National Intelligence observed that “there isn’t
a corporation in the nation today that can’t be penetrated, not one.”15 In
his Congressional testimony, Professor Chang stated: “Today our
opponents in cyberspace are intelligent, seam-seeking, shape-shifting
adversaries, that have an uncanny ability to penetrate and evade cyber
defenses and compromise the targeted system.”16
According to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, as of January,
2016, more than 736 million records (from 3,930 data breaches) were
reported as breached and exposed during 2015.17 During 2010, “one
company reported a breach of 38 terabytes of information—equivalent
to nearly double the amount of text contained in the Library of
Congress.”18 Even more troubling “is the fact that the Clearinghouse
records are not exhaustive, nor do they reflect breaches occurring
outside the United States.”19

14. Cyber R&D Challenges and Solutions: Hearings Before the H. Committee on Science,
Space & Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and the Subcommittee on Research, 113th
Cong. (2013) (statement of Frederick R. Chang, President & COO, 21CT, Inc. and former director
of research at the U.S. National Security Agency), http://bit.do/CyberRDChallenges.
15. Ben Worthen, Watching and Waiting: Most Cyberattacks are Random. But some
attackers know exactly whom they want, and how to strike, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2012),
http://bit.do/CyberattacksAreRandom.
16. Is Your Data on the Healthcare.gov Website Secure?: Hearings Before the H.
Committee on Science, Space & Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and the Subcommittee
on Research, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Frederick R. Chang, Bobby B. Lyle Centennial
Distinguished
Chair
in
Cyber
Security,
Southern
Methodist
University),
http://bit.do/HealthcareWebsiteSecure. See also John G. Palfrey, The Public and the Private at
the United States Border with Cyberspace, 78 MISS. L.J. 241 (2008).
17. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2015 Data Breach QuickView, RISKBASED SECURITY,
http://bit.do/2015DataBreach.
18. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse, We Need to Act on Cybersecurity, NAT’L L.J. (May 10,
2010), http://bit.do/ActOnCybersecurity.
19. Id.
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Exhibit One:
Reported Incidents of Loss, Theft or Exposure of Personally
Identifiable Information (PII)

Exhibit One, courtesy of Risk Based Security, Inc., presents a
disturbing picture of the rapid increase in data theft over the past five
years.20
A. Top Ten Major Breaches
Here, courtesy of Risk Based Security, Inc., is a list of the top ten
disclosed major breaches to date based on the number of records
exposed:21
1. UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION. Reported breach
of 220 million records on August 22, 2014.22
2. UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION. Reported breach
of 191 million exposed records in United States of
voter names, addresses, dates of birth, phone
numbers, genders, political party affiliations, and
20. Data Loss Statistics: Number of Incidents, RISK BASED SEC., INC. (2015),
http://bit.do/DataLossStatistics.
21. Id. at 11-13.
22. Id.
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other personal information (12/28/2015).23
3. NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMMISSION.
Breach exposing 173 million records, including
customer trip details (6/21/2014).24
4. ADOBE SYSTEMS, INC. Encounters a hack
exposing 152 million records, including customer
names, debit and credit card information with
expiration dates, IDs on October 3, 2013.25
5. SHANGHAI ROADWAY D&B MARKETING
SERVICES CO. LTD. Replaced the Heartland
Payments breach as the largest ever reported incident
at the time involving 150 million records in March
2012).26
6. eBAY, INC. Reports 145 million records
compromised on May 21, 2014.27
7. UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION. A breach
involving 140 million records is reported on June 8,
2013.28
8. HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS, TOWER
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, BEVERLY
NATIONAL BANK, NORTH MIDDLESEX
SAVINGS BANK, GOLDEN CHICK. Heartland
involved a theft by cybercriminals using malicious
software of 130 million credit and debit card
numbers, resulting in a securities fraud class action
for “fraudulently misrepresent[ing] the general state
of its data security” and concealing an earlier
cyberattack during earnings calls and in SEC
filings.29 Heartland knew that the stolen data included
names, credit and debit card numbers, and expiration
dates.30
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Shanghai Roadway D&B Marketing Services Co. Ltd., OPEN SOURCE
FOUNDATION/DATALOSSDB.ORG. (Mar. 3, 2012), http://bit.do/ShanghaiRoadway.
27. RISK BASED SEC., supra note 20; eBay Inc. Filing with U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission on Form 8-k (May 21, 2014), http://bit.do/eBayFilingSEC.
28. RISK BASED SEC., supra note 20.
29. Id.; In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 09-01043-AET-TJB, at 5 (D.N.J.
Dec. 7, 2009); see also Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1, at 333 (citing Brian Krebs,
Payment Processor Breach May be Largest Ever, WASH. POST SECURITY FIX BLOG,
http://bit.do/PaymentProcessorBreach (Jan. 20, 2009)).
30. RISK BASED SEC., supra note 20; Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1, at 333;
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9. TARGET
BRANDS
INC.,
FAZIO
MECHANICAL SERVICES, INC. Breach of 110
million records reported on December 18, 2013.31
10. HOME DEPOT. Breach of 109 million records with
details of payment cards and customer email
addresses (9/2/2014).32
II. HERE COME THE HACKERS
Contemporary examples of cyberattack include the widely
discussed breaches at Target,33 J.P. Morgan Chase,34 the U.S. Postal
Service,35 Home Depot,36 and the November 2014 breach of Sony
Pictures Entertainment.37 In many of these more recent cases, the facts
Press Release, Visa, Heartland Payments Systems Agrees on Settlement to Provide Visa Issuers
up to $60M for Data Breach Security Claims (Jan. 8, 2010), http://bit.do/
PaymentProcessorBreach; Press Release, Heartland Payment Systems, Heartland Payment
Systems® and Mastercard Agree to $41.4 Million Intrusion Settlement: Company has now
reached breach-related settlements with three major card brands (May 19, 2010),
http://bit.do/HeartlandSettlement3CardBrands; Press Release, Heartland Payment Systems,
Heartland Payment Systems and American Express Agree to $3.6 Million Intrusion Settlement:
Settlement marks first agreement with a card brand related to 2008 intrusion (Dec. 17, 2009),
http://bit.do/HeartlandAmExSettlement; Press Release, Heartland Payment Systems, Heartland
Payment Systems Agrees to Settle Cardholder Class Action Claim (Dec. 21, 2009),
PYMNTS.COM, http://bit.do/HeartlandSettleClassAction.
31. RISK BASED SEC., supra note 20.
32. Id.
33. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack The Next Pearl Harbor?,18 N.C.
J. OF L. & TECH. 232 (2016).
34. Emily Glazer, Danny Yadron & Daniel Huang, Hackers May Have Targeted at Least
13 Firms, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2014), http://bit.do/HackersTargetedFirms; Sarah Bloom Raskin,
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, Remarks Before the Meeting of the Texas
Bankers’ Association Executive Leadership Cybersecurity Conference: Cybersecurity for Banks:
10
Questions
for
Executives
and
Their
Boards
(Dec.
3,
2014),
http://bit.do/CybersecurityForBanks.
35. Laura Stevens & Danny Yadron & Devlin Barrett, U.S. Post Office Says it Was Victim
of a Data Breach, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2014), http://bit.do/USPostOfficeVictimBreach.
36. See Shelly Banjo, Home Depot Hackers Exposed 53 Million Email Addresses, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://bit.do/HomeDepotHack; Michael Calia, Breach Plagues Home Depot,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://bit.do/BreachPlaguesHomeDepot (reporting estimated cost of
hacking to be $34 million during 2014).
37. See Center for Strategic & International Studies, Significant Cyber Incidents Since
2006, (reporting that ‘Sony Pictures Entertainment is hacked, with the malware deleting data and
the hackers posting online employees’ personal information and unreleased films. The incident is
similar
to
earlier
hacks
against
South
Korean
media
outlets),
http://bit.do/CyberIncidentsSince2006; see also Adrienne Debigare, Rebekah Heacock Jones &
Jiou Park, 2014 Year In Review, In Urs Gasser, Jonathan Zittrain, Robert Faris & Rebekah
Heacock Jones, Internet Monitor 2014: Reflections on the Digital World: Platforms, Policy,
Privacy, and Public Discourse, at 12, 22 (Dec. 15, 2014), http://bit.do/ReflectionsOn
DigitalWorld; Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2014-17 (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://bit.do/Berkman ResearchPublication2014-17.
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are still being determined and litigation being brought. However,
valuable lessons can be learned from several of the more seasoned
breach cases of recent years, including Nortel and Heartland.
A. Nortel Hacked
Of particular importance to corporate boards and executives
seeking to acquire other businesses is the example of Nortel, a case
study that offers fair warning to all of the Trojan horse potential for
highly destructive malware and spyware through acquisitions of data
assets. Nortel Networks, a Canadian company traded publicly in the
U.S., “was a pioneering maker of the computer switches and telecom
gear that powers much of the world’s phone and internet networks.”38
Dating back to at least the year 2000, it appears Chinese-based hackers
successfully gained access, by using seven stolen passwords, including
a former CEO’s, to penetrate and leisurely download materially
everything they wanted from Nortel Networks.39 This breach included
the download of “technical papers, research-and-development reports,
business plans, employee emails and other documents according to
Brian Shields, a former 10-year Nortel veteran who led an internal
investigation.”40 The Wall Street Journal observes that “Nortel’s
breach offers a rare level of detail about a type of international
corporate espionage that is of a growing concern to U.S. officials. A
U.S. intelligence report released in November [2011] concluded that
hackers operating from China . . . are the world’s most ‘active and
persistent’ perpetrators of industrial spying.”41
Nortel has sold its component parts pursuant to their 2009
bankruptcy. However, according to several former employees, “the
company didn’t fix the hacking problem before starting to sell its
assets, and didn’t disclose the hacking to prospective buyers.”42 Sean
McGurk, credited with previously running the U.S. government’s
cybersecurity intelligence center, stated, “When you are buying those
files or that intellectual property, you’re also buying that ‘rootkit,’ . . .
a term that refers to embedded spy software.”43
The spyware unearthed in 2009 was a sophisticated mix . . . . [R]esearchers

38. Siobhan Gorman, Chinese Hackers Suspected in Long-Term Nortel Breach, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 14, 2012), http://bit.do/ChineseHackersSuspected.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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found a particularly malicious and hard-to-spot spying tool, namely
‘rootkit’ software that can give a hacker full control over a computer and
enables them to conceal their spying campaign . . . .
On one computer, hackers had set up an encrypted communications channel
to an Internet address near Beijing. On the other computer, the investigators
found a program that hackers were likely using to sniff out other security
weaknesses within Nortel’s networks. The hackers had created a ‘reliable
back door,” according to one person familiar with the investigation,
allowing them to come and go as they pleased in Nortel’s network.44

B. The Heartland Breach: What Happened
In another useful breach example, Heartland Payment Systems, a
major credit card processor, disclosed on January 20, 2009 that
cybercriminals had stolen 130 million credit card and debit card
numbers, “at the time believed to be the largest security breach ever.”45
As a result, “the company and its officers and directors were forced to
pay $60 million in a settlement with Visa,46 $41.4 million in a
settlement with MasterCard,47 $3.6 million in a settlement with
American Express,48 up to $2.4 million in a consumer cardholder class
action49 over the same breach, as well as the defense costs of the
dismissed suit.”50
On August 13, 2009 the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Payment Card Center hosted a workshop to “discuss lessons learned as
a result of [the Heartland] event [and to examine] the changing nature
of data security in consumer electronic payments.”51 Learning exactly
44. Gorman, supra note at 38.
45. Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1 at 333 (citing Brian Krebs, Payment
Processor Breach May be Largest Ever, WASH. POST SEC. FIX BLOG (Jan. 20, 2009),
http://bit.do/PaymentProcessorBreach).
46. Id. (citing Press Release, Visa, Heartland Payments Systems Agrees on Settlement to
Provide Visa Issuers up to $60M for Data Breach Security Claims (Jan. 8, 2010),
http://bit.do/HeartlandSettlementToVisaIssuers).
47. Id. (citing Press Release, Heartland Payment Systems, Heartland Payment Systems®
and Mastercard Agree to $41.4 Million Intrusion Settlement: Company has now reached breachrelated
settlements
with
three
major
card
brands
(May
19,
2010),
http://bit.do/HeartlandSettlement3CardBrands).
48. Id. (citing Press Release, Heartland Payment Systems, Heartland Payment Systems and
American Express Agree to $3.6 Million Intrusion Settlement: Settlement marks first agreement
with
a
card
brand
related
to
2008
intrusion
(Dec.
17,
2009),
http://bit.do/HeartlandAmExSettlement).
49. Id. (citing Press Release, Heartland Payment Systems, Heartland Payment Systems
Agrees
to
Settle
Cardholder
Class
Action
Claim
(Dec.
21,
2009),
http://bit.do/HeartlandSettleClassAction).
50. Id.
51. Julia S. Cheney, Heartland Payment Systems: Lessons Learned from a Data Breach
(Jan. 1, 2010), FRB of Philadelphia – Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper No. 10-1,
http://bit.do/HeartlandLessonsLearned.
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what happened at Heartland and other breaches is helpful in any
attempt to stave off future threats. In Heartland, their network
compromise “was ultimately determined to be SQL injection”:52
Code written eight years ago for a web form allowed access to Heartland’s
corporate network. This code had a vulnerability that (1) was not identified
through annual internal and external audits of Heartland’s systems or
through continuous internal system-monitoring procedures, and (2)
provided a means to extend the compromise from the corporate network to
the separate payment processing network. Although the vulnerability
existed for several years, SQL injection didn’t occur until late 2007.
After compromising Heartland’s corporate network, the intruders spent
almost six months and many hours hiding their activities while attempting
to access the processing network, bypassing different anti-virus packages
used by Heartland. After accessing the corporate network, the fraudsters
installed sniffer software that was able to capture payment card data,
including card numbers, card expiration dates, and, in some cases,
cardholder names as the data moved within Heartland’s processing
system.53
The fraudsters’ focus on compromising data as they moved within
Heartland’s network – data in transit – rather than when they were stored in
consumer databases – or, in other words, when data were at rest – was a
relatively new phenomenon . . . . One example, if not the first, of this
expansion in focus toward data-in-transit compromises was the data breach
at Hannaford Brothers announced in early 2008.54

Heartland Chairman and CEO Robert Carr outlines Heartland’s
response to the breach as “rest[ing] on two pillars aimed at the
merchant acquiring and processing side of the payment system:
improve data sharing and better secure data, particularly data in
transit.”55 The Heartland breach was particularly unexpected since the
company “was certified by network-approved quality security
assessors (QSAs) as being PCI compliant at the time of the breach and,

52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. According to a Heartland press release, “[n]o merchant data or cardholder Social
Security numbers, unencrypted personal identification numbers (PIN), addresses or telephone
numbers were involved in the breach. Nor were any of Heartland’s check management systems;
Canadian, payroll, campus solutions or micropayments operations; Give Something Back
Network; or the recently acquired Network Services and Chockstone processing platforms.” See
Press Release, Heartland Payment Systems, Heartland Payment Systems Uncovers Malicious
Software in its Processing System (Jan. 20, 2009), http://bit.do/HeartlandUncoversMalicious
Software.
54. Cheney, supra note 51 (citing Clarke Canfield & Brian Bergstein, Hannaford Data
Breach Offers Twists from Prior Attacks, FOSTERS.COM (Mar. 20, 2008),
http://bit.do/HannafordDataBreach).
55. Cheney, supra note 51, at 5.

2016]

MANAGING CYBERTHREAT

243

in fact, had received this certification several times during the period
in which the vulnerability had been present.56 In addition,
[Mr. Carr] used this point not to diminish PCI but rather to emphasize that
PCI compliance is a minimum standard and that most companies regularly
do much more than required by PCI. Heartland Payment Systems was one
of those companies that had met its PCI requirements and had made data
security one of its top, if not its top, business priorities. Carr said that
Heartland manages data security 24/7 and has about 7 percent of its
information technology staff focused on security efforts, including a
recently hired senior executive who focuses solely on data security and
strategy. That data breach occurred despite Heartland’s strong focus on data
security and its status as being PCI compliant has led Carr to the opinion
that more must be done to increase the security of data transfers (data in
transit) among participants in the payments system, including merchants.57

C. Heartland’s Lessons Learned
Heartland Chairman and CEO Robert Carr offered the following
additional comments about the Heartland data breach incident:
1. Do not underestimate the insider threat,
2. Ensure the appropriate audit scope, and
3. Maintain in-house security expertise at the senior executive
level.58
Mr. Carr also emphasized that
insider threats may not stem from intentional fraud but rather from
misplaced employee goodwill. For example, an employee may retain
cached files, including account information, on their computer in order to
more quickly process customer service requests. In addition, security
protocols must be universally applied and enforced among all employees,
at all levels of hierarchy and across all departments. Ensuring that auditors
have a wide scope to review systems for security vulnerabilities is also
important to identify situations, such as happened at Heartland, in which
fraudsters were able to penetrate the processing system by first
compromising another, separate network, in this case the corporate
network. Finally, security expertise and strategic planning are critical skills
that should be emphasized at the highest levels of the corporate structure.59

56. Id. at 4.
57. Id. at 4 (citing James C. McGrath & Ann Kjos, Information Security, Data Breaches,
and Protecting Cardholder Information: Facing Up to the Challenges, Payment Cards Center 6
(Sept. 13-14, 2006), http://bit.do/FacingUpToChallenges); see also Brendan James Gilbert, PCI
Compliance
for
Outsources
eCommerce
Applications
(May
3,
2009),
http://bit.do/PCICompliance; and Ulf T. Mattsson, PCI and Beyond – How to Secure Data in the
Most Cost Effective Manner (Jan. 20, 2009), http://bit.do/SecureDataCostEffective.
58.
Cheney, supra note 51, at 8.
59.
Id.
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D. FBI Action Against Cybercrime and Credit Card Theft
During mid-2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
announced “the largest coordinated international law enforcement
action in history directed at ‘carding’ crimes—offenses in which the
Internet is used to traffic in and exploit the stolen credit card, bank
account, and other personal identification information of hundreds of
thousands of victims globally.”60 As the result of a two-year
investigation, the coordinated cybercrime sting, which involved
thirteen countries, including the United States,
resulted in 24 arrests, including the domestic arrests of 11 individuals . . .
in the United States, and the arrests of 13 individuals abroad by foreign law
enforcement in seven countries . . . [and] prevented estimated potential
economic losses of more than $205 million, notified credit card providers
of over 411,000 compromised credit and debit cards, and notified 47
companies, government entities, and educational institutions of the breach
of their networks.61

Those eleven arrests took place “in the United Kingdom (six
arrests), Bosnia (two), Bulgaria (one), Norway (one), and Germany
(one). Two additional defendants were arrested in foreign countries
based on provisional arrest warrants obtained by the United States in
connection with complaints unsealed today in the Southern District of
New York.”62 The FBI allegations “chronicle a breathtaking spectrum
of cyber schemes and scams… individuals sold credit cards by the
thousands and took the private information of untold numbers of
people. As alleged, the defendants casually offered every stripe of
malware and virus to fellow fraudsters.”63
According to the FBI press release, “In June 2010, the FBI
established an undercover carding forum called ‘Carder Profit’ (the
‘UC Site’), enabling users to discuss various topics related to carding
and to communicate offers to buy, sell, and exchange goods and

60. FBI Press Release, Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Assistant Director in Charge
Announce 24 Arrests in Eight Countries as Part of International Cyber Crime Takedown (June
26, 2012), http://bit.do/24ArrestsCybercrime.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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services related to carding, among other things.”64 The UC Site was
established by the FBI
in an effort to identify these cybercriminals, investigate their crimes, and
prevent harm to innocent victims. The UC Site was configured to allow the
FBI to monitor and to record the discussion threads posted to the site, as
well as private messages sent through the site between registered users. The
UC Site also allowed the FBI to record the Internet protocol (IP) addresses
of users’ computers when they accessed the site. The IP address is the
unique number that identifies a computer on the Internet and allows
information to be routed properly between computers.
Access to the UC Site, which was taken offline in May 2012, was limited
to registered members and required a username and password to gain entry.
Various membership requirements were imposed from time to time to
restrict site membership to individuals with established knowledge of
carding techniques or interest in criminal activity. For example, at times,
new users were prevented from joining the site unless they were
recommended by two existing users who had registered with the site or
unless they paid a registration fee.
New users registering with the UC Site were required to provide a valid email address as part of the registration process. The e-mail addresses
entered by registered members of the site were collected by the FBI.65

According to the FBI, the term “carding” involves “various
criminal activities associated with stealing personal identification
information and financial information belonging to other individuals—
including the account information associated with credit cards, bank
cards, debit cards, or other access devices—and using that information
to obtain money, goods, or services without the victims’ authorization
or consent.”66 To illustrate,
a criminal might gain unauthorized access to (or “hack”) a database
maintained on a computer server and steal credit card numbers and other
personal information stored in that database. The criminal can then use the
stolen information to . . . buy goods or services online; manufacture
counterfeit credit cards by encoding them with the stolen account
information; manufacture false identification documents (which can be
used in turn to facilitate fraudulent purchases); or sell the stolen information
to others who intend to use it for criminal purposes. Carding . . .
encompasses a variety of federal offenses, including, but not limited to,
identification document fraud, aggravated identity theft, access device
fraud, computer hacking, and wire fraud.67

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
FBI Press Release, supra note 60.
Id.
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The term “carding forums” refers to websites used by carders
to exchange information related to carding, such as information concerning
hacking methods or computer-security vulnerabilities that could be used to
obtain personal identification information; and to buy and sell goods and
services related to carding—for example, stolen credit or debit card account
numbers, hardware for creating counterfeit credit or debit cards, or goods
bought with compromised credit card or debit card accounts. Carding
forums often permit users to post public messages—postings that can be
viewed by all users of the site—sometimes referred to as threads. For
example, a user who has stolen credit card numbers may post a public thread
offering to sell the numbers.68

The FBI provides the following explanation of how many of these
illegal criminal activities are conducted:
Individuals who use stolen credit card information to purchase goods on the
Internet are typically reluctant to ship the goods to their own home
addresses, for fear that law enforcement could easily trace the purchases.
Accordingly, carders often seek out “drop addresses”—addresses with
which they have no association, such as vacant houses or apartments—
where carded goods can be shipped and retrieved without leaving evidence
of their involvement in the shipment. Some individuals used carding forums
to sell “drop services” to other forum members, usually in exchange for
some form of compensation. One frequently used form of compensation is
a “1-to-1” arrangement in which the carder wishing to ship to the drop must
ship two of whatever items he has carded—one for the provider of the drop
to forward to the carder and the other for the provider of the drop to keep
as payment in kind for the carder’s use of the drop. Another frequently used
compensation arrangement is for the carder and the drop provider to agree
to resell the carded items shipped to the drop and to split the proceeds
between them.69

III. BARBARIANS AT THE GATES
A. Post-9/11 Transnational Legal Framework
The increased reliance on cyber warfare and advances in computer
technology as a front line of offensive and defensive national security
weapons means that “cybersecurity is the newest and most unique
national security issue of the twenty-first century.”70 This de facto new
transnational legal environment has evolved following the 9/11
destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City and is
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Stuart S. Malawer, Cyber Warfare: Law and Policy Proposals for U.S. and Global
Governance, 58 VA. LAWYER 28 (2010) (citing Wesley K. Clark & Peter L. Levin, Securing the
Information Highway: How to Enhance the United States Electronic Defenses, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
2 (Nov/Dec 2009), http://bit.do/SecuringInformationHighway).
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“turbocharged by [the] unexpected recent challenges, which include
terrorism, financial chaos, and environmental and national security.”71
Stuart S. Malawer observes that “the emergent rules are drawn from
disparate legal systems. This newer body of legal rules is termed
‘global law,’ which can be defined as legal rules drawn from different
systems that address a range of cross-border topics.”72 Moreover,
[t]he rules originate from public international law (such as the law of war),
specialized international legal systems (such as rules governing the
international environment, global trade, and international finance), regional
legal systems (governing such areas as human rights), and major national
legal systems as they confront transnational problems (such as torture,
counterterrorism, and cybersecurity). These rules sometimes establish
binding obligations, and other times, something less.
To competently practice law and undertake policy analysis in today’s world
of failing states, transnational terrorism, global pollution, and growing
multilateral institutions, practitioners and policy makers must understand
the legal contours of this dramatically changing environment.73

B. Assault on Federal, State and Local Governments
It appears that government agencies are the prime targets of
certain groups intent on creating highly-visible cyber disruption
problems. On June 15, 2011, “Lulz Security, a group of hackers who
have been responsible for a number of recent online data breaches, took
aim at some United States government agencies . . . . The group said
via Twitter that it had brought down the Central Intelligence Agency
website, presumably with a so-called denial of service attack.”74
Although “a denial of service attack involves using many computers to
bombard a Web site with an overload of traffic, knocking it offline--these types of attacks do not result in data being stolen or servers being
breached.”75 During the same week Lulz Security claimed
responsibility for several other victims, including an F.B.I. Web site
and an internal file from the U.S. Senate Web site.”76 The same group
previously claimed responsibility for the PBS and Sony Pictures
breaches.77
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Nick Bilton, Hacking Group Says It Brought Down C.I.A. Site, N.Y. TIMES (June 15,
2011), http://bit.do/HackingGroupBroughtDownCIASite.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. See also Lawrence J. Trautman, The SONY Data Hack: Implications for World
Order (unpublished manuscript).
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Pinguelo and Muller reported that “the weak American economy
[post-2008] has caused most states to severely trim their budgets,
reducing their ability to devote expenditures to cyberdefense.”78 As a
result, most states “remain an appealing target for cybercriminals, as
their networks hold some of their citizens’ most vital information,
including health and driving records, educational and criminal records,
professional licenses, and tax information.79 In particular,
State universities are an especially vulnerable target, as shown in May 2009
when officials at the University of California-Berkeley announced that
hackers had stolen the Social Security numbers of approximately 97,000
students, alumni, and others over the course of six months. Meanwhile, in
September 2010, cybercriminals stole nearly $1 million from the University
of Virginia’s College at Wise. The cyber thieves compromised a computer
belonging to the university’s comptroller, and used a computer virus to gain
access to the University’s bank account. Luckily, the school was able to
recover the money.80

While potentially applicable at the state government level, the
Government Accounting Office (GAO), in its 2009 report for the
federal government, outlined the following six major sources of cyber
threats: “foreign nations, criminal groups, hackers, hacktivists
[politically motivated attacks], disgruntled insiders and terrorists”:81
In a post-9/11 world, the prospect of a rogue cyberterrorist is particularly
frightening, especially when considering some of the methods that could be
used to cripple the nation: [A] cyberterrorist might hack into computer
systems and disrupt domestic banking, the stock exchanges and
international financial transactions, leading to a loss of confidence in the
economy. Or he might break into an air traffic control system and
manipulate it, causing planes to crash or collide. A terrorist could hack into
a pharmaceutical company’s computers, changing the formula of some
essential medication and causing thousands to die. Or a terrorist could break
into a utility company’s computers, changing pressure in gas lines,
tinkering with valves and causing a suburb to detonate and burn.82

C. Cyberattack: A National Security Issue

78. Fernando M. Pinguelo & Bradford W. Muller, Virtual Crimes, Real Damages: A
Primer on Cybercrimes In The United States and Efforts to Combat Cybercriminals, 16 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 120 (2011) (citing Deloitte & NASCIO, State Goverrnments at Risk: A Call to Secure
Citizen Data and Inspire Public Trust (2010), http://bit.do/CallToSecureData).
79. Id. (citing Deloitte.com, Transcript: The Cyber Savvy State Government, (on file with
author)).
80. Pinguelo & Muller, supra note 78, at 120, n.18.
81. Id. at 122.
82. Id. (citing Mark D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on
Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace, 6 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, 18 (2002)).
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“The next Pearl Harbor that we confront could very well be a
cyberattack that cripples’ America’s electrical grid and its security and
financial systems,” observed Central Intelligence Agency Director
Leon Panetta in his June 9, 2011 confirmation hearing for the post of
secretary of defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee.83 A
Wall Street Journal article titled Cyber Combat: Act of War, observes
“The Pentagon’s first formal cyber strategy . . . represents an early
attempt to grapple with a changing world in which a hacker could pose
as significant a threat to U.S. nuclear reactors, subways or pipelines as
a hostile country’s military.”84 A question every enterprise should ask
is whether its top management and board have a contingency plan in
place in the event that the U.S. power grid is compromised and
electricity becomes unavailable for a prolonged period of time. The
Wall Street Journal article described the current landscape:
Recent attacks on the Pentagon’s own systems--- as well as the sabotaging
of Iran’s nuclear program via the Stuxnet computer worm—have given new
urgency to U.S. efforts to develop a more formalized approach to cyber
attacks. A key moment occurred in 2008, when at least one U.S. military
computer system was penetrated… Lockheed Martin, a major military
contractor, acknowledged that it had been the victim of an infiltration, while
playing down its impact . . . .
One idea gaining momentum at the Pentagon is the notion of ‘equivalence.’
If a cyber attack produces the death, damage, destruction or high-level
disruption that a traditional military attack would cause, then it would be a
candidate for a “use of force” consideration, which could merit retaliation.85

Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn says that “If we can
minimize the impact of attacks on our operations and attribute them
quickly and definitively, we may be able to change the decision
calculus of an attacker.”86 The problem is massive, as “[e]ach year, a
volume of intellectual property exceeding the size of the Library of
Congress is stolen from U.S. Government and private-sector

83. Anna Mulrine, CIA Chief Leon Panetta: The Next Pearl Harbor Could Be a
Cyberattack,
THE
CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR
(June
9,
2011),
http://bit.do/PearlHarborCouldBeCyberattack; see also Eric Talbot Jensen, President Obama and
the Changing Cyber Paradigm, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5049 (2011); Stuart Malawer, supra
note 70; Scott Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in
International Law, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 191 (2009).
84. Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL ST. J. (May
31, 2011), http://bit.do/CyberCombatActOfWar.
85. Id.
86. Julian E. Barnes & Siobhan Gorman, Cyberwar Plan Has New Focus On Deterrence,
WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2011), http://bit.do/CyberwarPlanFocusDeterrence.
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networks.”87 U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta “noted a July [2012]
attack against Saudi Arabia’s state oil company, Aramco, in which a
virus erased critical files on some 30,000 computers, replacing them
with images of burning American flags.”88 During March 2014, the
New York Times reports that “Chinese hackers broke into computers
that stored the personal information of all United States government
employees.”89 During May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice
charged five Chinese hackers, identified as “officers of Unit 61398 of
the Third Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)”
with cyber espionage directed at six American companies, including:
Alcoa; Allegheny Technologies Inc.; U.S. Steel; Westinghouse
Electric Co.; U.S. subsidiaries of SolarWorld AG; and others.90
According to the DOJ,
The indictment alleges that the defendants conspired to hack into American
entities, to maintain unauthorized access to their computers and to steal
information from those entities that would be useful to their competitors in
China, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In some cases, it alleges,
the conspirators stole trade secrets that would have been particularly
beneficial to Chinese companies at the time they were stolen. In other cases,
it alleges, the conspirators also stole sensitive, internal communications that
would provide a competitor, or an adversary in litigation, with insight into
the strategy and vulnerabilities of the American entity.
“This is a case alleging economic espionage by members of the Chinese
military and represents the first ever charges against a state actor for this
type of hacking,” U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder said. “The range of
trade secrets and other sensitive business information stolen in this case is
significant and demands an aggressive response. Success in the global
market place should be based solely on a company’s ability to innovate and
compete, not on a sponsor government’s ability to spy and steal business
secrets. This Administration will not tolerate actions by any nation that
seeks to illegally sabotage American companies and undermine the integrity
of fair competition in the operation of the free market.”
“For too long, the Chinese government has blatantly sought to use cyber
espionage to obtain economic advantage for its state-owned industries,”

87. Id.
88. Julian E. Barnes & Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Readies Defense Against Cyberthreats,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2012), http://bit.do/ReadiesDefense.
89. Matt Apuzzo, Chinese Businessman is Charged in Plot to Steal U.S. Military Data,
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2014), http://bit.do/ChineseChargedStealUSMilitaryData.
90. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for
Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial
Advantage: First Time Criminal Charges Are Filed Against Known State Actors for Hacking
(May 19, 2014), http://bit.do/USCharges5ChineseMilitaryHackers.
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said FBI Director James B. Comey.91

Mortimer Zuckerman, Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of U.S.
News & World Report adds, “Cyberterrorism poses a threat equal to
that of weapons of mass destruction. A large scale attack could create
an unimaginable degree of chaos in America.”92 Zuckerman continues
We should think of cyberattacks as guided missiles and respond similarly—
intercept them and retaliate. This means we need a federal agency dedicated
to defending our various networks. You cannot expect the private sector to
know how—or to have the money—to defend against a nation-state attack
in a cyberwar . . . . Few nations have used computer networks as extensively
as we have to control electric power grids, airlines, railroads, banking and
military support. Few nations have more of these essential systems owned
and operated by private enterprise. As with 9/11, we do not enjoy the luxury
of a dilatory response.93

What if major transportation systems are disrupted, such as
airlines traffic control systems? Cyberattacks may negatively impact
your business operations, even if your enterprise is not the sole focus
of attack. What would be the result to your operations if the U.S.
payment systems are compromised by a successful cyberattack on
financial institutions? The SEC issued a recent study, Observations on
Developments in Risk Appetite Frameworks and IT Infrastructures,
which was conducted by senior financial supervisors from ten countries
and concluded
[T]hat while firms have made progress in developing risk appetite
frameworks and have begun multi-year projects to improve IT
infrastructure, considerably more work must be done to strengthen these
practices. In particular, the aggregation of risk data remains a challenge,
despite its criticality to strategic planning, decision making, and risk
management.94

Richard Clarke, former White House national security advisor to
three U.S. presidents, writes “If we discovered Chinese explosives laid
throughout our national electrical system, we’d consider it an act of

91. Id.
92. Mortimer Zuckerman, How to Fight and Win the Cyberwar, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6,
2010), http://bit.do/FightAndWinCyberwar; see also Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke,
Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Conscripts 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1011 (2010); Susan W.
Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Civilians in Cyberwarfare: Casualties, 13 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
249 (2010).
93. Zuckerman, supra note 92.
94. SEC Release No. 2010-256, Senior Supervisors Group Issues Report on Risk Appetite
Frameworks and IT Infrastructure (Dec. 23, 2010), http://bit.do/ReportOnRiskAppetite.
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war. Digital bombs pose as grave a threat.”95 Just a few days prior to
Richard Clarke’s published article, Google reported that “Chinese
hackers targeted the email accounts of senior U.S. officials and
hundreds of prominent people in a fresh computer attack certain to
intensify growing concern about the security of the Internet.”96 Clarke
further observes that
Ongoing cyber ‘hacktivism’ has . . . demonstrated three things that should
cause nations to act. First, the ease with which the hacktivists have been
able to steal data and to shut down Web pages suggests that companies (and
perhaps governments) in the region [Middle East] have not yet taken cyber
security seriously. Governments in other regions (Asia, Europe, North
America) have been educating, assisting and regulating companies to
improve their cyber security. There has been a notable lack of such
government activity in the Middle East, and that inactivity has opened the
way for citizen hackers to cause the mischief we see today.
If the hackers turn their attention to disruption and destruction, as some have
threatened, they are likely to find the controls for electric power grids, oil
pipelines and precious water systems inadequately secured. If a hacker
causes real physical damage to critical systems in that region, it could
quickly involve governments retaliating against each other with both cyber
and conventional weapons. Middle Eastern governments need to get their
citizen hackers under control and better protect their own critical networks,
or they will eventually be dragged into unwanted conflict.
Second, the Arab-Israeli hacker exchanges have demonstrated again the
lack of any effective international organization to assist in preventing cyber
crime and de-escalating tensions among nations in cyberspace. The
Budapest Convention on Cyber Crime, which entered into force in July
2004 and has been ratified by more than 40 countries including the U.S.,
does require nations to assume responsibilities for any attacks that originate
in their cyberspace.97

Clarke proposes an “International Cyber Risk Reduction Center,”
and notes that if “Saudi Arabia’s stock market is again knocked offline by a cyber attack originating in Israel (or vice versa), the Saudi’s
should be able to call an international center and seek assistance.”98
Furthermore, “Israel as a member of the international center should be
able to act promptly to see the attack and shut it down. All of this should
95. Richard Clarke, China’s Cyberassault on America, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2011),
http://bit.do/ChinasCyberassaultOnAmerica.
96. Amir Efrati & Siobhan Gorman, Google Mail Hack Is Blamed on China, WALL ST. J.
(June 2, 2011), http://bit.do/GMailHackBlamedChina; see also Siobhan Gorman, China Tech
Giant Under Fire, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2012), http://bit.do/ChinaTechUnderFire; Spencer E.
Ante, Huawei’s Ally: IBM, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://bit.do/HuaweiAllyIBM.
97. Richard Clarke, Cyber Attacks Can Spark Real Wars, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://bit.do/CyberAttacksSparkRealWars.
98. Id.
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happen in a few hours.”99 Scholars are exploring how computer warfare
might “limit unnecessary suffering and reduce civilian casualties.”100
D. Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future
During November 2011, the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security published its Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future: The
Cybersecurity Strategy for the Homeland Security Enterprise, which
was “designed to protect the critical systems and assets that are vital to
the United States, and, over time, to foster stronger, more resilient
information and communication technologies to enable government,
business and individuals to be safer online.”101 The Blueprint provides
for two areas of action, “Protecting our Critical Information
Infrastructure Today and Building a Stronger Cyber Ecosystem for
Tomorrow.”102 In addition, four goals for protecting the critical
information infrastructure are listed: “reduce exposure to cyberrisk;
ensure priority response and recovery; maintain shared situational
awareness; and increase resilience.”103 Homeland Security Secretary
Janet Napolitano observed:
Emerging cyber threats require the engagement of the entire society—from
government and law enforcement to the private sector and most
importantly, members of the public. Today in cyberspace, the Nation faces
a myriad of threats from criminals, including individual hackers and
organized criminal groups, as well as technologically advanced nationstates. Individuals and well-organized groups exploit technical
vulnerabilities to steal American intellectual property, personal
information, and financial data. The increasing number and sophistication
of these incidents has the potential to impact our economic competitiveness
and threaten the public’s ability to access and obtain basic services.
Government, non-governmental and private sector entities, as well as
individuals, families, and communities must collaborate on ways to
effectively reduce risk.104

99.

Id.; see also JAY P. KESAN & CAROL M. HAYES, THINKING THROUGH ACTIVE DEFENSE
(2010); Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No.
LBSS10-02; Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 10-11, http://bit.do/IllinoisPublicLawPaper;
Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in
Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 429 (2012).
100. Brian T.O’Donnell & James C. Kraska, Humanitarian Law: Developing International
Rules for the Digital Battlefield, 8 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 133 (2003).
101. Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future: The Cybersecurity Strategy for the Homeland
Security Enterprise, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Nov. 2011),
http://bit.do/BlueprintSecureCyberFuture.
102. Id. at iii.
103. Id.
104. Id.
IN CYBERSPACE 327-42
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E. Failure of Cybersecurity Act of 2012
Despite consensus that cyberthreats represent a clear and present
danger, Congress has not been particularly quick to act during the past
decade. Senate Bill S.2105 (Cybersecurity Act of 2012), which failed
to clear the Senate in August 2012, required private companies
operating critical infrastructure to meet certain security
requirements.105 This proposed legislation required companies
operating “power plants, oil pipelines and other vital services to meet
certain security standards.”106 Other requirements included
establishing a “mechanism for industry to more easily share
information on threats with the government.”107 Senator Joseph
Lieberman stated:
Every day rival nations, terrorist groups, criminal syndicates and individual
hackers probe the weaknesses in our most critical computer networks,
seeking to steal government and industrial secrets or to plant cyber agents
in the cyber systems that control our most critical infrastructure and would
enable an enemy to seize control of a city’s electric grid or water supply
system with the touch of a key from a world away. The current ongoing and
growing cyber threat not only threatens our security here at home, but it is
right now having a very damaging impact on our economic prosperity.
Extremely valuable intellectual property is being stolen regularly by cyber
exploitation by people and individuals and groups and countries abroad. It
is then being replicated without the initial cost done by American
companies. This means jobs are being created abroad that would otherwise
be created here. So when we talk about cybersecurity, people naturally
focus on the very real danger that an enemy will attack us through
cyberspace, but as we think about how to grow our economy and create jobs
again, I’ve come to the conclusion this is one of the more important things
we can do to protect the treasures of America’s intellectual innovation from
being stolen by competitors abroad.108

On August 8, 2012, John O. Brennan, at that time Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism gave his “U.S.
Policy toward Yemen” speech before the Council on Foreign

105. S.2105, 112th Cong. (2012). See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional
Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who & How It Works, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 147 (2016).
106. Siobhan Gorman, Senators Push a Bill on Security, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2012);
http://bit.do/SenatorsPushSecurityBill; see generally Stephen Dycus, Congress’s Role in Cyber
Warfare, 4 J. NAT’L. SEC. L. & POL’Y 153 (2010).
107. Gorman, supra note 106.
108. Securing America’s Future: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012: Hearing Before the Comm.
On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. (Feb. 16, 2012) (Opening
Statement of Chairman Joseph Lieberman), http://bit.do/SecuringAmericasFuture; but see Susan
W. Brenner, Cyber-Threats and the Limits of Bureaucratic Control, 14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.
137 (2011).
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Relations. Following his prepared remarks, Mr. Brennan, now Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency, remarked that the consequences of
the failed cybersecurity legislation is that “we’re not going to have
enhanced authorities and capabilities of the U.S. government to deal
with what is an increasingly serious cyber challenge to our nation and
to our critical infrastructure in particular. We worked very hard to try
to push forward and advance the cybersecurity provisions”109 Mr.
Brennan continued,
[T]he . . . American people are the ones that are going to be at risk, not just
because of . . . personal identification information that is going to be out
there, but also the water we drink . . . the electricity that we . . . depend
upon, the hospitals that require that type of support, critical infrastructure—
that’s increasingly at risk . . . .
[T]here are different types of cyberintrusions that we see. There are
cyberintrusions to get to understand your environment. So they go in, and
then it’s sort of operationally preparing the environments. [They] can go in
just to map it so [they] understand it . . . to infiltrate certain type of data, or
. . . [to] understand it and then…. take actions to disrupt, disable it and
destroy [data] . . . .
[W]hat we’re seeing now is a lot of intrusions. We’re seeing a lot of
infiltrations . . . and then the next step is, again, the disruptive, disabling,
destructive types of attacks. And so . . . electric grids, water treatment
facilities . . . mass transportation systems . . . railways and trains,
whatever—if those intruders get into those systems and then can determine
how they can in fact interfere in the command and control systems of these
systems, they . . . could . . . put trains onto the same tracks. They can . . .
bring down electric grids . . . .
[S]ome [foreign countries] . . . have tremendous . . . cyber capabilities . . .
some of the most powerful countries in the world . . . . [D]o they want to
bring down that critical infrastructure in the United States right now? No,
because they rely on the U.S. economy, in fact for a number of reasons.
There are some foreign actors out there, though, that if they had the
opportunity to bring down elements of the U.S. economy, U.S.
infrastructure, I think would do it . . . in a instant. So they fortunately don’t
have the capability at this time. They may have the intent but not the
capability. But you also have international criminal groups . . . [who] can
do things to advance . . . criminal intent by bringing down certain types of
. . . activities or infrastructure. So there could be all types of different
reasons or different types of . . . groups or people that are doing this . . . .
The president’s priority is to protect the safety and security of the American
people. That’s the physical security of the American people as well as the
prosperity of the American people . . . . And . . . we’ve been pushing. We’ve
worked hard. We delivered our legislative package to the Hill . . . April,
109. Ritika Singh, Transcript of John Brennan’s Speech on Yemen and Drones, LAWFARE
(Aug. 8, 2012), http://bit.do/TrascriptBrennanYemenSpeech.
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May of last year, 2011. And unfortunately the Senate bill went down last
week . . . it may be revived, but we can’t wait. So we’re doing things. DHS,
in conjunction with . . . NSA, FBI, others, are working to make sure that
we’re able to better safeguard our environment but also be able to respond
and also to be resilient . . . . [O]ne of the approaches is if [cyber terrorists]
take down some part of our critical infrastructure, you want to be able to . .
. recover very quickly.110

Reports of nation states mounting massive daily attacks against
American computers are legion.111 During mid-2012, the New York
Times reported that “In March [2012] the White House invited all the
members of the Senate to a classified simulation on Capital Hill
demonstrating what might happen if a dedicated hacker—or an enemy
110. Id.; see also Susan W. Brenner, Organized Cybercrime? How Cyberspace May Affect
the Structure of Criminal Relationships, 4 N.C.J. L. & TECH. 1 (2002).
111. See generally ROBERT AXELROD & RUMEN ILIEV, THE STRATEGIC TIMING OF CYBER
EXPLOITS, APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper, Am. Pol. Sci. Assn. (2013),
http://bit.do/StrategicTimingCyberExploits; Laurie R. Blank, Cyberwar / Cyber Attack: The Role
of Rhetoric in the Application of Law to Activities in Cyberspace, in CYBERWAR: LAW & ETHICS
FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS (Jens David Ohlin et al. eds., 2015), http://bit.do/RoleOfRhetoric; Paul
Ducheine, Joop Voetelink, Jan F. Stinissen & Terry D. Gill, Towards a Legal Framework for
Military Cyber Operations, in CYBER WARFARE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 101-28 (Paul
Ducheine et al. eds., 2012), http://bit.do/MilitaryCyberOperations; CYBER WARFARE: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 101-28 (Paul Ducheine et al. eds., 2012), Kristen Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of
Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317 (2015); Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley
Proctor, Aileen Elizabeth Nowlan, William Perdue & Julia Spiegel, The Law of Cyber-Attack,
100 CAL. L. REV. 817 (2012); Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the
Effects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533 (2010); Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative
Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429 (2012);
AFRODITI PAPANASTASIOU, APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CYBER WARFARE
OPERATIONS (2010), http://bit.do/CyberWarfareOperations; HAOTIAN QI, CYBER CAPITALISM
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS? DOMESTIC SOURCES OF CHINA’S DIGITAL OFFENSIVE, APSA
2014 Annual Meeting Paper (2014); Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107
NW. U.L. REV. 1503 (2013); Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of Cyber Warfare: Quo Vadis?, 25
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 269 (2014); Scott Shackelford & Amanda Craig, Beyond The New
“Digital Divide”: Analyzing the Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance
and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119 (2014); Christina Parajon Skinner, An
International Law Response to Economic Cyber Espionage, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1165 (2014); T.P.,
Chinese Cyber-Attacks, Hello, Unit 61398, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://bit.do/ChineseCyberAttacksHello; Communist Chinese Cyber-Attacks, Cyber-Espionage
and Theft of American Technology: Hearing Before the H. SubComm. On Oversight and
Investigations of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 112-14 (2011); PETER SOMMER &
IAN BROWN, REDUCING SYSTEMIC CYBERSECURITY RISK, Organisation for Economic
Cooperation
and
Development
Working
Paper
No.
IFP/WKP/FGS(2011)3,
http://bit.do/ReducingSystemicCybersecurityRisk; Paul Stockton & Michele Golabek-Goldman,
Curbing the Market for Cyber Weapons, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239 (2013); Peter Swire, A
Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network
Security?, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 163 (2004); Remus Titiriga, Cyber Attacks and
International Law of Armed Conflicts: A ‘Jus Ad Bellum’ Perspective, 8 J. INT’L COMM. L. &
TECH. 179 (2013); Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future
of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421 (2011).
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state—decided to turn off the lights in New York City.112 As a result,
the Pentagon “has proposed that military cyber-specialists be given
permission to take action outside its computer networks to defend
critical U.S. computer systems”:113
Advances in technology and mounting concern about the potential for a
cyber-attack to damage power stations, water-treatment plants and other
critical systems have prompted senior officials to seek a more robust role
for the department’s Cyber Command.
The proposed rules would open the door for U.S. defense officials to act
outside the confines of military-related computer networks to try to combat
cyberattacks on private computers, including those in foreign countries.
In establishing the new regulations, officials have sought to overcome
concerns that action in another country’s networks could violate
international law, upset allies or result in unintended consequences, such as
the disruption of civilian networks.114

F. Executive Order 13636 and Critical Infrastructure
Following defeat of The Lieberman Cybersecurity Act during
August 2012, The White House started circulating a draft cybersecurity
Executive Order that “would establish a voluntary program where
companies operating critical infrastructure would elect to meet
cybersecurity best practices and standards crafted, in part, by the
government.”115 On February 12, 2013, President Obama signed
Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity,” which directs the Executive Branch to:
1. Develop a technology-neutral voluntary cybersecurity framework;
2. Promote and incentivize the adoption of cybersecurity practices;
3. Increase the volume, timeliness and quality of cyber threat information
sharing;
4. Incorporate strong privacy and civil liberties protections into every
initiative to secure our critical infrastructure; and

112. David E. Sanger, Mutually Assured Cyberdestruction?, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2012),
http://bit.do/MutuallyAssuredCyberdestruction.
113. Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon proposes more robust role for its cyber-specialists, WASH.
POST (Aug. 9, 2012), http://bit.do/PentagonRobustRoleCyberSpecialists.
114. Id.
115. Jennifer Martinez, White House Circulating Draft of Executive Order on
Cybersecurity, THE HILL (Sept. 6, 2012), http://bit.do/WhiteHouseDraftCybersecurity. See also
Siobhan Gorman, Senator Presses on Cybersecurity, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2012),
http://bit.do/SenatorPressesCybersecurity.

258

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 33

5. Explore the use of existing regulation to promote cybersecurity. 116

In addition, Presidential Policy Directive-21: Critical
Infrastructure Security and Resilience replaces Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-7, and directs the Executive Branch to:
1. Develop a situational awareness capability that addresses both physical
and cyber aspects of how infrastructure is functioning in near-real time;
2. Understand the cascading consequences of infrastructure failures;
3. Evaluate and mature the public-private partnership;
4. Update the National Infrastructure Protection Plan; and
5. Develop comprehensive research and development plan.117

What exactly constitutes “critical infrastructure”? The 2013
Executive Order defines the term “critical infrastructure” as “systems
and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that
the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national
public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”118 By way
of historical prespective, by the mid-1990s, “the growing threat of
international terrorism led policy makers to reconsider the definition of
“infrastructure” in the context of homeland security.”119 As early as
1996, President Clinton recognized that:
These critical infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical power
systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance,
transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including
medical, police, fire and rescue), and continuity of government. Threats to
these critical infrastructures fall into two categories: physical threats to
tangible property (“physical threats”), and threats of electronic, radiofrequency, or computer-based attacks on the information or
communications components that control critical infrastructures (“cyber
threats”).120

116. Fact Sheet on Executive Order (EO) 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity and Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21 Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 2013), http://bit.do/Improving
CriticalInfrastructure. See generally Exec. Order No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11737 (Feb. 19, 2013),
http://bit.do/ImprovingCriticalInfrastructureCybersecurity.
117. Id.
118. Exec. Order No. 13636, supra note 116, at § 2.
119. JOHN MOTEFF & PAUL PARFOMAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32631, CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY ASSETS: DEFINITION AND IDENTIFICATION (2004).
120. Exec. Order No. 13010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37345 (July 15, 1996).
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In 2001, Executive Order 13228121 created the Office of Homeland
Security and required the protection of:
• Energy production, transmission, and distribution services and critical
facilities
• Other utilities
• Telecommunications
• Facilities that produce, use, store, or dispose of nuclear material
• Public and privately owned information systems
• Special events of national significance
• Transportation, including railways, highways, shipping ports and
waterways
• Airports and civilian aircraft
• Livestock, agriculture, and systems for the provision of water and food
for human use and consumption.122

President Bush’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board was
created by Executive Order 13231.123 A definition of “critical
infrastructure was contained in The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L.
107-56),124 and the Bush administration’s strategy for homeland
security is articulated in The National Strategy for the Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.125
G. Treasury Report on Cybersecurity Incentives
The 2013 Executive Order also directs “the Secretary of the
Treasury, along with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of
Homeland Security to each make recommendations on a set of
incentives that would promote private sector participation in the
voluntary program.”126 This Treasury Report provides policymakers
121. Exec. Order No. 13228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51812 (Oct. 10, 2001).
122. See id. Section 3(e)(i)-(vi).
123. See Exec. Order No. 13231, 86 Fed. Reg. 53061 (Oct. 18, 2001).
124. See MOTEFF & PARFOMAK, supra note 119 at CRS-7.
125. See Office of the President, The National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructure and Key Assets (Feb. 2003).
126. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
ON CYBERSECURITY INCENTIVES PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636, at 2-3, n.4 (2013)
(citing Exec. Order 13636, supra note 116, at Sec. 8(d)) (“The Secretary of [Homeland Security]
shall coordinate establishment of a set of incentives designed to promote participation in the
[voluntary cybersecurity] Program. Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary and
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with outlines to assess and “evaluate the benefits and relative
effectiveness of government incentives in promoting the adoption of
the eventual Framework. It seeks to identify types of situations in
which private incentives may be insufficient to provide an appropriate
level of cybersecurity.”127 In discussing a general approach to
principles for government incentives, the Treasury Report observed:
Generally, government policy tools to provide incentives to private sector
participants should be considered when private incentives are insufficient
to provide a desirable level of additional investment in an area, such as
increasing cybersecurity. Economists refer to this condition as market
failure . . . .
When a market failure exists and private market solutions are inadequate,
government support in the form of incentives may be appropriate. If a
government role is warranted, the potential incentive should ideally: (i) be
appropriately tailored and scaled to the magnitude of the under-investment
in cybersecurity; (ii) protect taxpayers by being cost-effective while still
achieving the policy objectives; (iii) adjust to changing circumstances and
the availability of new information; (iv) be coordinated, so as not to
duplicate, other incentives; and (v) motivate private sector entities to
expend their own resources to further protect their critical infrastructure
assets. These principles should be crucial factors in ant decision about
whether the government should provide incentives; however, they should
not be viewed as requirements.128

The Treasury Report further identifies and discusses the following
cybersecurity market failures: underinvestment in knowledge; barriers
to information sharing; coordination failures; network externalities;
and adverse selection of insurance risks.129 Next, the Treasury Report
turns to a discussion and evaluation of potential government incentives,
including: enhancing information usage capabilities to support
information sharing; leveraging framework adoption to clarify liability
risk; government funding to encourage basic cybersecurity research;
providing technical assistance; further accelerating the security
clearance process; potential tax incentives; and cyber insurance.130

Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce each shall make recommendations separately to the
President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and
the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, that shall include analysis of the benefits and
relative effectiveness of such incentives, and whether the incentives would require legislation or
can be provided under existing law or authorities to participants in the Program.”).
127. Id. at 3.
128. Id. at 3-4.
129. Id. at 5-6.
130. Id. at 8-25. See generally Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against
the Effects of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533 (2010).
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H. Framework on Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity
Executive Order 13636 mandates “development of a voluntary
risk-based Cybersecurity Framework—a set of industry standards and
best practices to help organizations manage cybersecurity risks. The
resulting Framework, created through collaboration between
government and the private sector, uses a common language to address
and manage cybersecurity risk.”131 Sensitive to imposing additional
regulatory requirements on business, the Framework attempts to focus
on business needs in a cost-effective way.132 As a threshold
observation, “The Framework complements, and does not replace, an
organization’s risk management process and cybersecurity program.
An organization can use its current processes and leverage the
Framework to identify opportunities to strengthen and communicate its
management of cybersecurity risk while aligning with industry
practices.”133 Important to many, “an organization without an existing
cybersecurity program can use the Framework as a reference to
establish one.”134
1. Each Enterprise’s Need Is Unique
The Framework recognizes that risk management of cybersecurity
requires “a clear understanding of the organization’s business drivers
and security considerations specific to its use of [information
technology] and [industrial control systems] is required. Because each
organization’s risk is unique . . . the tools and methods used to achieve
the outcomes described by the Framework will vary.”135 Accordingly:
The Framework focuses on using business drivers to guide cybersecurity
activities and considering cybersecurity risk as part of the organization’s
risk management process. The Framework consists of three parts: the
Framework Core, the Framework Profile, and the Framework
Implementation Tiers. The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity
activities, outcomes, and informative references that are common across

131. U.S. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY,
Ver.
1.0,
at
5
(Feb.
12,
2014),
http://bit.do/FrameworkCriticalInfrastructure. See also Scott Shackelford, Andrew A. Proia,
Brenton Martell & Amanda Craig, Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring
the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable National
and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305 (2015).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 4.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 3.

262

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 33

critical infrastructure sectors, providing the detailed guidance for
developing individual organizational Profiles. Through use of the Profiles,
the Framework will help the organization align its cybersecurity activities
with its business requirements, risk tolerances, and resources. The Tiers
provide a mechanism for organizations to view and understand the
characteristics of their approach to managing cybersecurity risk . . . .
The Framework enables organizations—regardless of size, degree of
cybersecurity risk, or cybersecurity sophistication—to apply the principles
and best practices of risk management to improving the security and
resilience of critical infrastructure. The Framework provides organization
and structure to today’s multiple approaches to cybersecurity by assembling
standards, guidelines, and practices that are working effectively in industry
today . . . .136

2. The Framework Is Organic
Designed as “a model for international cooperation on
strengthening critical infrastructure cybersecurity,” the Framework
“references globally recognized standards for cybersecurity.”137
Accordingly, the Framework is intended to be:
[A] living document and will continue to be updated and improved as
industry provides feedback on implementation. As the Framework is put
into practice, lessons learned will be integrated into future versions. This
will ensure it is meeting the needs of critical infrastructure owners and
operators in a dynamic and challenging environment of new threats, risks,
and solutions.
Use of this voluntary framework is the next step to improve the
cybersecurity of our Nation’s critical infrastructure ̶ providing guidance for
individual organizations, while increasing the cybersecurity posture of the
Nation’s critical infrastructure as a whole.138

The Framework is designed to “be used with a broad array of
cybersecurity risk management processes. Examples of cybersecurity
risk management processes include International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) 31000:2009,139 ISO/IEC 27005:2011,140
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special
136. Id. at 1.
137. U.S. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., supra note 131, at 1-2.
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id. at 6 (citing International Organization for Standardization, Risk management –
Principles and guidelines n.3-5, ISO 31000:2009 (2009), http://bit.do/ISO31000
Riskmanagement.
140. International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical
Commission, Information technology—Security techniques—Information security risk
management, ISO/IEC 27005:2011 (2011), http://bit.do/InformationTechnologySecurity
Techniques.
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Publication (SP) 800-39,141 and the Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity
Risk Management Process (RMP) guideline.142 All charged with the
responsibility for cybersecurity governance should obtain and become
familiar with The Framework. This is a roadmap for having a dialogue
about cybersecurity in any organization.
I.

Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (“2014 Review”)

The Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s mission
areas and risk-informed priorities stated that “the terrorist threat in
increasingly decentralized and may be harder to detect. Cyber threats
are growing and pose ever-greater concern to our critical infrastructure
systems as they become increasingly interdependent.”143 In addition,
the 2014 Review observed:
We must, over the next four years, continue efforts to address the growing
cyber threat, illustrated by the real, pervasive, and ongoing series of attacks
on our public and private infrastructure. This infrastructure provides
essential services such as energy, telecommunications, water,
transportation, and financial services and is increasingly subject to
sophisticated cyber intrusions which pose new risks. As the Federal
Government’s coordinator of efforts to counter cyber threats and other
hazards to critical infrastructure, DHS must work with both public and
private sector partners to share information, help make sure new
infrastructure is designed and built to be more secure and resilient, and
continue advocating internationally for openness and security of the internet
and harmony across international laws to combat cybercrime. Further, DHS
must secure the Federal Government’s information technology systems by
approaching federal systems and networks as an integrated whole and by
researching, developing, and rapidly deploying cybersecurity solutions and
services at the pace that cyber threats evolve. And finally, we must continue
to develop cyber law enforcement, incident response, and reporting
capabilities by increasing the number and inpact of cybercrime
investigations, sharing information about tactics and methods of cyber
criminals gleaned through investigations, and ensuring that incidents
reported to any federal department or agency are shared across the U.S.
government. In addition, the Federal Government must continue to develop
good working relationships with the private sector, lower barriers to
partnership, develop cybersecurity best practices, promote advanced
technology that can exchange information at machine speed, and build the

141. Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative, Managing Information Security Risk:
Organization, Mission, and Information System View, NIST Special Publication 800-39 (March
2011), http://bit.do/ManagingInfoSecurityRisk.
142. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Risk Management
Process, DOE/OE-0003 (May 2012), http://bit.do/ElectricitySubsectorCybersecurityRisk.
143. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review,
at 5 (2014), http://bit.do/QuadrennialHomelandSecurityReview.
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cyber workforce of tomorrow for DHS and the Nation.144

The 2014 Review provides a description of the strategic
environment, guiding principles, strategic priorities such as securing
against the evolving threat of terrorism, biological hazards and threats,
potential nuclear terrorism, immigration challenges, and associated
issues.145 The 2014 Review also noted that:
Transnational criminal organizations rely on revenues generated through
the sale of illegal drugs and counterfeit goods, human trafficking and
smuggling, and other criminal activities. These organizations continue to
expand in size, scope, and influence and are capitalizing on technological
innovation, including new platforms to sell illicit goods, innovative ways
of moving money, tools for coordinating operations, and a variety of other
criminal and cyber activities…
As transnational criminal organizations grow stronger and challenge or
corrupt governments in many regions, they are moving more freely,
expanding their networks, and acquiring and distributing military-grade
equipment. Violent extremist networks can also conduct these profitable
criminal activities on their own, exploiting the same vulnerabilities in
finance, trade and travel, and immigration.146

The 2014 Review notes that “Cyberspace and its underlying
infrastructure are vulnerable to a wide range of risk stemming from
both physical and cyber threats and hazards. Sophisticated cyber actors
and nation states exploit vulnerabilities to steal information and money
and are developing capabilities to disrupt, destroy, or threaten the
delivery of essential services.”147 Cyberspace has brought
technological advantage to traditional crimes, including “the
production and distribution of child pornography and child exploitation
conspiracies, banking and financial fraud, intellectual property
violations, and other crimes, all of which have substantial human and
economic consequences.”148 The DHS has articulated its mission as
“Mission 4: Safeguard and Secure Cyberspace” and is included here as
Exhibit Two.
144. Id. at 7-8.
145. See generally id.
146. Id. at 26. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What
Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2014); Lawrence
J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit, 68
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 262 (2014); Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin Harrell, Bitcoin vs.
Regulated Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Lawrence
J. Trautman, Following the Money: Lessons from the Panama Papers, Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg,
__ PENN ST. L. REV. __ (forthcoming), http://bit.do/FollowingTheMoney.
147. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 143, at 39.
148. Id.
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Exhibit Two:
DHS Mission 4: Safeguard & Secure Cyberspace
Goal 4.1: Strengthen the Security and Resilience of Critical
Infrastructure
Enhance the exchange of information and intelligence on risks to critical
infrastructure and develop real-time situational awareness capabilities that
ensure machine and human interpretation and visualization;
Partner with critical infrastructure owners and operators to ensure the
delivery of essential services and functions;
Identify and understand interdependencies and cascading impacts among
critical infrastructure systems;
Collaborate with agencies and the private sector to identify and develop
effective cybersecurity policies and best practices; and
Reduce vulnerabilities and promote resilient critical infrastructure design.
Goal 4.2: Secure the Federal Civilian Government Information
Technology Enterprise
Coordinate government purchasing of cyber technology to enhance costeffectiveness
Equip civilian government networks with innovative cybersecurity tools
and protections; and
Ensure government-wide policies and standards are consistently and
effectively implemented and measured.
Goal 4.3: Advance Law Enforcement, Incident Response, and
Reporting Capabilities
Respond to and assist in the recovery from cyber incidents; and
Deter, disrupt, and investigate cybercrime.
Goal 4.4: Strengthen the Ecosystem
Drive innovative and cost effective security products, services, and
solutions throughout the cyber ecosystem;
Conduct and transition research and development, enabling trustworthy
cyber infrastructure;
Develop skilled cybersecurity professionals; enhance public awareness and
promote cybersecurity best practices; and
Advance international engagement to promote capacity building,
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international standards, and cooperation.149

J. Congressional Cybersecurity Action
During December 2014, just hours before the holiday recess, the
U.S. Congress passed several major legislative proposals designed to
enhance U.S. cybersecurity: The National Cybersecurity Protection
Act of 2014;150 The Federal Information Security Modernization Act
of 2014;151 The Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act;152 The
Homeland Security Workforce Assessment Act;153 and the
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014.154 Following signature by the
President, these became the first cybersecurity laws to be enacted in
over a decade, since passage of the Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002.155
IV. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RISK GOVERNANCE
The following regulatory developments deserve the attention of
top management and those responsible for cybersecurity governance of
any enterprise. Accordingly, attention is given to a discussion of recent
comments by the SEC on risk, Dodd-Frank legislation, and SEC
disclosure guidelines.
A. The SEC on Risk & Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
Effective February 28, 2010, SEC rules amended Regulation S-K
(Item 407) to require disclosure about the board’s role in a company’s
risk oversight process and its leadership structure.156 The SEC noted:
149. Id. at 78.
150. National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066
(2014).
151.
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128
Stat. 3073 (2014).
152. Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act, Pub. L. No. 113-246, 128 Stat. 2880 (2014).
153. Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-277, 128 Stat. 2995
(2014).
154. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971 (2014).
155. See generally Mitchell S. Kominsky, supra note 7 (citing ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND
DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS (2014)). See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity:
What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 J.L. TECH. & PUB. POLY 341 (2015).
156. The text of the new rule reads: “(h) Board leadership structure and role in risk oversight.
Briefly describe the leadership structure of the registrant’s board, such as whether the same person
serves as both principal executive officer and chairman of the board, or whether two individuals
serve in those positions, and, in the case of a registrant that is an investment company, whether
the chairman of the board is an “interested person” of the registrant as defined in section 2(a)(19)
of the Investment Company Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(19)). If one person serves as both principal
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According to the SEC’s final rule release, the new disclosure rules require
“companies.… to describe how the board administers its risk oversight
function, such as through the whole board, or through a separate risk
committee or the audit committee, for example.”157 Disclosures should
address, for example, “whether the individuals who supervise the day-today risk management responsibilities report directly to the board as a whole
or to a board committee or how the board or committee otherwise receives
information from such individuals.”158 Such disclosures should also include
an explanation of the board’s leadership structure and the “reasons why the
company believes that this board leadership structure is the most
appropriate structure for the company.”159 In companies in which the CEO
and Chairman are the same individual, rule “amendments will require
disclosure of whether and why the company has a lead independent director,
as well as the specific role the lead independent director plays in the
leadership of the company.”160

Large financial institutions are required by the Dodd-Frank Act to
establish independent risk committees on their boards,161 with at least
one member of the committee required to have risk management
experience at a large, complex firm.162 Highly disruptive developments
such as Bitcoin’s blockchain technology continue to confront financial
service providers with substantial risk management issues.163 This
comes at a time when many of the world’s largest financial institutions
are still engaged in recovering and rebuilding capital after the global
financial collapse of 2007-2008.164

executive officer and chairman of the board, or if the chairman of the board of a registrant that is
an investment company is an “interested person” of the registrant, disclose whether the registrant
has a lead independent director and what specific role the lead independent director plays in the
leadership of the board. This disclosure should indicate why the registrant has determined that its
leadership structure is appropriate given the specific characteristics or circumstances of the
registrant. In addition, disclose the extent of the board’s role in the risk oversight of the registrant,
such as how the board administers its oversight function, and the effect that this has on the board’s
leadership structure.”
157. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 9089, Exchange Act
Release No. 61,175, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,092, at 44 (Dec. 16, 2009).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 43.
160. Id.
161. John Lester & John Bovenzi, The Dodd-Frank Act: What it does, what is means, and
what happens next, OLIVER WYMAN POINT OF VIEW (2010).
162. Id. See also Scott Landau, et. al. Dodd-Frank Act Reforms Executive Compensation
and Corporate Governance for All Public Companies, PILLSBURY CLIENT ALERT (July 15, 2010).
163. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future
of Financial Services?, 69 THE CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 232 (2016) ; Lawrence J. Trautman &
Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Importance of Insurance in Managing Corporate Cyberthreat Risk,
(unpublished paper).
164. See generally Lawrence J. Trautman, Personal Ethics & the U.S. Financial Collapse
of 2007-08, (forthcoming), http://bit.do/PersonalEthics.
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Creation of a risk committee is one pro-active approach to the
increased emphasis on risk oversight and the possibility of risk
committees being mandated for some or all public companies.165 As
observed elsewhere, “While having a stand-alone risk committee can
serve to relieve strained audit committees, it is important that qualified,
independent directors serve on the risk committee. It is also imperative
that creating a risk committee does not abdicate all responsibility for
risk away from the rest of the directors.”166
B. SEC Disclosure Guidelines
The proliferation of cyberattacks during 2010 and 2011 resulted
in the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance announcing disclosure
guidance for cybersecurity issues on October 13, 2011.167 The Division
of Corporation Finance stated: “For a number of years, registrants have
migrated toward increasing dependence on digital technologies to
conduct their operations. As this dependence has increased, the risks to
registrants associated with cybersecurity have also increased, resulting
in more frequent and severe cyber incidents.”168 In addition, “there has
been increased focus by registrants and members of the legal and
accounting professions on how these risks and their related impact on
the operations of a registrant should be described within the framework
of the disclosure obligations imposed by the federal securities laws.”169
Accordingly, the Division “determined that it would be beneficial to
provide guidance that assists registrants in assessing what, if any,
disclosures should be provided about cybersecurity matters in light of
each registrant’s specific facts and circumstances.”170 The Division
prepared guidance to:
Be consistent with the relevant disclosure considerations that arise in
connection with any business risk. We are mindful of potential concerns
165. For example, the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation has an independent risk
committee whose purpose “is to assist the Board of Directors in fulfilling its oversight
responsibilities with regard to (a) the risks inherent in the business of the Corporation and the
control processes with respect to such risks, (b) the assessment and review of credit, market,
fiduciary, liquidity, reputational, operational, fraud, strategic, technology, data-security and
business-continuity risks, (c) the risk management activities of the Corporation and its
subsidiaries, and (d) fiduciary activities of the Corporation’s subsidiaries.” Risk Committee
Charter (Apr. 12, 2016), http://bit.do/RiskCommitteeCharter.
166. Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1, at 320.
167. CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2 Cybersecurity, SEC DIV. OF CORP. FIN. (Oct.
13, 2011), http://bit.do/SECCFDisclosure.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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that detailed disclosures could compromise cybersecurity efforts -- for
example, by providing a “roadmap” for those who seek to infiltrate a
registrant’s network security -- and we emphasize that disclosures of that
nature are not required under the federal securities laws.
In general, cyber incidents can result from deliberate attacks or
unintentional events. We have observed an increased level of attention
focused on cyber attacks that include, but are not limited to, gaining
unauthorized access to digital systems for purposes of misappropriating
assets or sensitive information, corrupting data, or causing operational
disruption. Cyber attacks may also be carried out in a manner that does not
require gaining unauthorized access, such as by causing denial-of-service
attacks on websites. Cyber attacks may be carried out by third parties or
insiders using techniques that range from highly sophisticated efforts to
electronically circumvent network security or overwhelm websites to more
traditional intelligence gathering and social engineering aimed at obtaining
information necessary to gain access.
The objectives of cyber attacks vary widely and may include theft of
financial assets, intellectual property, or other sensitive information
belonging to registrants, their customers, or other business partners. Cyber
attacks may also be directed at disrupting the operations of registrants or
their business partners. Registrants that fall victim to successful cyber
attacks may incur substantial costs and suffer other negative consequences,
which may include, but are not limited to:
•

Remediation costs that may include liability for stolen assets or
information and repairing system damage that may have been
caused. Remediation costs may also include incentives offered to
customers or other business partners in an effort to maintain the
business relationships after an attack;

•

Increased cybersecurity protection costs that may include
organizational changes, deploying additional personnel and
protection technologies, training employees, and engaging third
party experts and consultants;

•

Lost revenues resulting from unauthorized use of proprietary
information or the failure to retain or attract customers following
an attack;

•

Litigation; and

•

Reputational damage adversely affecting customer or investor
confidence

The Division further stated that
Registrants should disclose the risk of cyber incidents if these issues are
among the most significant factors that make an investment in the company
speculative or risky. In determining whether risk factor disclosure is
required, we expect registrants to evaluate their cybersecurity risks and take
into account all available relevant information, including prior cyber

269

270

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 33

incidents and the severity and frequency of those incidents. As part of this
evaluation, registrants should consider the probability of cyber incidents
occurring and the quantitative and qualitative magnitude of those risks,
including the potential costs and other consequences resulting from
misappropriation of assets or sensitive information, corruption of data or
operational disruption. In evaluating whether risk factor disclosure should
be provided, registrants should also consider the adequacy of preventative
actions taken to reduce cybersecurity risks in the context of the industry in
which they operate and risks to that security, including threatened attacks
of which they are aware . . . .171

V. BOARD COMPOSITION: THE CASE FOR CYBERSECURITY
EXPERTISE
A. Each Board Has Different Levels of IT and Cybersecurity
Skills
Optimal corporate board composition is different for companies
engaged in different industries and at different stages of their
lifecycle.172 The board of a young software or consulting company may
be inundated with information technology (IT) understanding,
expertise and talent; while the board of an oil and gas or fast food
company may have little understanding of IT issues. IT domain issues
must be adequately represented among corporate board members,
particularly for companies having significant cybersecurity risks
related to their business activities, such as internet-based sales.
It’s a safe bet that no corporate directors were born with a
comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity and information
technology. Accordingly, “some boards provide directors with IT
education sessions outside the boardroom, similar to strategy retreats,
which may be held on the day before or after a full board meeting.”173
Deloitte suggests that “a first session may focus on the organization’s
overall IT structure and objectives, while subsequent sessions may be
scheduled whenever a major IT development occurs.”174
B. Organizational IT and Cybersecurity Knowledge
It appears “relatively few boards draw upon what may be the best
source of IT knowledge within the organization—the Chief
Information Officer (CIO).” Deloitte suggests that “boards should
171. Id.
172. See generally Trautman, supra note 8, at 88.
173. Deloitte Report, The Tech-Intelligent Board: Priorities for Tech-Savvy Directors as
they oversee IT Risk and Strategy, at 9 (2011), http://bit.do/Tech-IntelligentBoard.
174. Id.
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establish a regular reporting relationship with the CIO, similar to the
relationship with the CFO on financial issues, to ensure that IT
communications flow smoothly to the board.”175 That is, the language
of “business” is required for effectiveness, not the nomenclature of
technology. Also, “it may be easier and faster for directors and the CIO
to develop an effective rapport when the board members have the
opportunity to interact with the CIO outside the boardroom, for
example, at a combined board/management dinner prior to a board
meeting.”176
C. The Audit Committee: Appropriate Site for IT Expertise and
Experience
Because the Audit Committee is responsible for quality control,
internal accounting controls, and risk assessment, an understanding of
the enterprises’ IT logically seems to be a foundation issue before audit
quality, internal accounting controls, or risk assessment can be
addressed.177 A key responsibility of the internal audit function is to
keep the board’s audit committee “apprised of emerging [IT] risks”
says PricewaterhouseCoopers, observing that “in the risk assessment
report that it presents to the audit committee, internal audit should
highlight the organization’s significant data security and privacy risks,
including any new risks.”178 Moreover, the Audit Committee
Should identify weaknesses in policies and controls. At one global financial
services firm, for example, the internal audit function briefs the audit
committee about risks it sees within the company, both present and
potential. In turn, the company’s audit committee often alerts internal audit
and management to emerging security issues that directors hear about at
other firms with which they are involved. Such two-way exchanges
between internal audit and the audit committee are invaluable in keeping
the spotlight on emerging information security risks.
Because the nature of information security risks is evolving continuously,
internal audit functions need to stay ahead of the threat curve. Internal audit
functions should participate in numerous internal and external forums to
stay plugged in to emerging security threats, and practices for protecting
against them. Networking internally and externally on information security
issues is vital to staying vigilant.

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id., see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial
Expert Under SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 205 (2013).
178. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Fortifying Your Defenses: The Role of Internal Audit in
Assuring Data Security and Privacy, 8 (2012), http://bit.do/InternalAuditDataSecurity.
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Internal audit’s role in ensuring that information security threats are
properly considered becomes especially important when a company is
ready to roll out a new business process, product, or information system. In
such initiatives, the project team does not always believe it has time to fully
consider data security, particularly if the initiative has fallen behind
schedule…. Internal audit is uniquely positioned to assess whether existing
controls are being used, but it must also keep its ear to the ground and move
quickly to conduct special audits for new information security threats,
which some executives consider as important as regularly scheduled
audits.179

D. Barriers to IT-Internal Audit Effectiveness
PwC believes that “for most companies, information security and
privacy is [a] critical risk because of its potential to cause financial and
reputational damage, and because it is so difficult to mitigate” and that
data security attacks may best be combated through the use of three
primary lines of defense: Management; Risk Management and
Compliance Functions; and Internal Audit.180 The PwC report
“commonly find[s] four barriers in organizations that try to adopt
effective data privacy and security measures:
1.

A mindset that believes adequate controls are already in place;

2.

Cost;

3.

Low expectations of internal audit’s capabilities in data privacy; and

4.

Fragmented responsibilities.181

VI. YOUR CYBERSECURITY CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN
Every enterprise should have a cybersecurity crisis management
plan in place before a disaster occurs, since “advance planning is a key
prevention measure for any business. In an emergency incident
response situation, a well-written and properly socialized incident
response plan will be the best method to inform the relevant
stakeholders, identify the incident, and contain the security breach.”182
In addition,
Often times during an emergency situation, well-intentioned administrators
make changes that either disrupt the business or jeopardize the integrity of
the digital evidence. It is critical that the incident response plan lays out a

179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 9.
Pinguelo & Muller, supra note 80, at 82.
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proper chain of command.
Companies should also perform a mock-incident response training scenario
once a year to ensure adoption of the plan and its effectiveness, as a welloiled machine functions much more efficiently than a rusty one. A mockincident exercise will also test the viability of the written plan. Finally,
companies should work with a team of dedicated IT security experts who
are knowledgeable and experienced in dealing with IT security threats and
incident response. This can be an internal team or an external partner. It
may not always make sense for every organization to have this level of
expertise in-house, thus partnering with a reputable company may be the
more reasonable solution.183

Every enterprise can implement the following elements of a crisis
management plan before a crisis takes place. Of particular importance,
identifying and having a relationship with the professionals needed to
assist in stressful times is always best handled when sufficient time is
available to make reasoned decisions. A cyber disaster requires making
decisions about:
1. Damage Assessment: How you intend to ascertain exactly
what has happened.
2. Public Relations: How you intend to respond (since timeliness
is critical).
3. Need for Outside Assistance: Who is needed to assist you
with this highly technical problem.
4. Resources needed to cure defects that allowed this breach to
happen.
5. How you intend to monitor & prevent future reoccurrences.184
Hyundai Capital Services Inc., South Korea’s largest consumerfinance company, sustained a computer system hack and blackmail
attempt from two groups of hackers.185 Mr. Chung, Hundai Capital’s
chief executive, believed:
His biggest mistake was that he used to treat the information-technology
department as simply one of many units that helped the company get its
main job done. Learning from this hacking experience, he now treats the
Information Technology function as “central to everything the company
does. Since the attack, Mr. Chung has spent weeks learning the ins and outs
of network architecture, security infrastructure and the tradeoffs between

183. Id.
184. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Jason Triche & James C. Wetherbe, Corporate Information
Technology Governance Under Fire, 8 J. STRAT. & INT’L STUD. 110 (2013).
185. Evan Ramstad, Executive Learns from Hack: CEO Now Treats IT Department as
Critical to Hyundai Capital’s Operations, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2011),
http://bit.do/ExecLearnsFromHack.
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data protection and customer satisfaction.
The IT department, which has added a security unit, now reports directly to
the CEO. The company has slowed the introduction of several new products
to ensure they don’t create new holes in security.186

VII. A CALL TO ACTION: WHAT YOU CAN DO, NOW!
We now turn our attention to specific recommendations about
what every organization can do to increase their cybersecurity
defenses. Professor Frederick Chang paraphrases 19th century engineer
and mathematical physicist Lord Kelvin to say that “you can’t manage
what you don’t measure.”187 While important cybersecurity defense
work
[i]s taking place, we need improvements in hard, objective metrics and
measures of security. Metrics are needed at many very practical levels. At
a very tactical level, how do you know if computer system A is more or less
secure than computer system B? Is computer system A more or less secure
than it was last month? Last year? At a corporate level, how do you measure
the security of your corporate information technology infrastructure? Is it
more secure now than it was last year? Do the measures allow a pinpoint
assessment of where corporate improvements are necessary? At a much
more macro level, what metrics are best used to determine if the industry as
a whole is making progress toward improving its cybersecurity posture?
How would you measure the effect of an important government policy
change in cybersecurity? Is it making the difference that was intended? It is
relatively straightforward to determine the effects of changing the speed
limit on [traffic] accidents. It won’t be so clear for cybersecurity.
Developing a disciplined, agreed-upon, and readily implementable set of
metrics for cybersecurity remains a hard problem. Perhaps we can look for
some assistance from other fields ̶ medical research has successfully
employed metrics to improve the science of human health. Measures of
human health and cyber health share an important common ingredient: in
both cases we are attempting to measure the absence of something bad
(human disease or system compromise).188

Lessons to be learned from those on the front lines of
cybersecurity defense include: leadership commitment at the top; focus
on basic cyber hygiene; the SANS Institute Critical Security Controls;
the OWASP Top Ten list; CWE/SANS Top 25 most dangerous
software errors list; the DHS National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and U.S. Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT); thoughts about the role and

186.
187.
188.

Id.
See Chang testimony, supra note 14.
Id.
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value of a chief Information Officer; and the U.S. Department of the
Treasury’s list of ten ways to improve cybersecurity.
A. Leadership Commitment at the Top
Like any other challenge requiring enterprise resources of
significant time and money, to be successful, governance of IT and
cybersecurity issues require commitment at the very top. Deloitte states
that it is difficult to get IT issues on the board agenda because “in some
cases, the board lacks members with the appropriate experience and
expertise to be comfortable in addressing issues related to IT.”189 In
many organizations, “senior technology officers are poorly equipped to
communicate and work with the board. And when management and the
board have not previously established clear and consistent
communications on IT matters, IT often remains a foreign topic in the
boardroom.”190 The challenges associated with achieving
understanding and management of the risks involved with
implementing new technologies may appear almost insurmountable.
Every corporation’s IT challenges and concerns will include:
• Recognizing the importance of IT at the highest
(board) level and settling upon goals and necessary
resources
• Aligning IT strategy with the business strategy
• Cascading strategy and goals down into the enterprise
• Providing organizational structures that facilitate the
implementation of strategy and goals
•
•

Insisting that an IT control framework be adopted and
implemented
Measuring IT’s performance191

B. Basic Cyber Hygiene
Perhaps the most significant step that can be taken to prevent
cyber intrusion in your organization is to require frequent changes to
passwords. It is the weakest link in technology systems that often
define security issues:
Hackers need just one way in. As technical security measures improve (e.g.

189. Deloitte, supra note 173, at 9.
190. Id.
191. Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, supra note 1, at 326 (citing USI Insurance Services,
Cyber Liability / Security and Privacy Insurance (2009) (on file with the author)).

276

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 33

greater use of encryption), then people increasingly become the weakest
link. Hackers often employ a tactic known as ‘social engineering’ to trick
computer operators to divulge sensitive information that can be used to
compromise a system (e.g. a password). These tactics can be extremely
effective and much easier to accomplish than a technical compromise.
Indeed the well-known hacker Kevin Mitnick reported in testimony to
Congress that he was so successful in social engineering that he rarely had
to resort to a technical attack. More generally, there are a well-known set of
cognitive biases that people use to assess risk and make decisions. These
biases often cloud our reasoning and cause us to improperly assess risk, in
many domains, including in cyberspace. We must take steps to strengthen
the weakest link. Gaining a much richer understanding of the cognitive
biases at work in the context of decision-making in cyberspace would be
just one of many important issues that need research at the intersection of
psychology and cybersecurity.192

C. SANS Institute Critical Security Controls
Over the years the National Security Agency (NSA) became
increasingly concerned that, in everyday practice, efforts to govern data
systems and prevent breaches, had all too often become “exercises in
reporting on compliance and have actually diverted security program
resources from the constantly evolving attacks that must be
addressed.”193 Accordingly, during 2008 NSA started “prioritizing a
list of the controls that would have the greatest impact in improving
risk posture against real-world threats. A consortium of U.S. and
international agencies quickly grew, and was joined by experts from
private industry and around the globe.”194 This list ultimately became
known as the Critical Security Controls and was coordinated through
the SANS Institute. The Council on CyberSecurity, a global,
independent, non-profit entity committed to a secure and open Internet
assumed responsibility during 2013. SANS noted that:
The Critical Security Controls focuses first on prioritizing security
functions that are effective against the latest Advanced Targeted Threats,
with a strong emphasis on “What Works” - security controls where
products, processes, architectures and services are in use that have
demonstrated real world effectiveness. Standardization and automation is
another top priority, to gain operational efficiencies while also improving
effectiveness. The actions defined by the Controls are demonstrably a
subset of the comprehensive catalog defined by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-53. The Controls do not attempt
to replace the work of NIST, including the Cybersecurity Framework
developed in response to Executive Order 13636. The Controls instead
192. Chang testimony, supra note 14.
193. The CIS Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defense, SANS INSTITUTE,
http://bit.do/CriticalSecurityControls.
194. Id.
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prioritize and focus on a smaller number of actionable controls with highpayoff, aiming for a “must do first” philosophy. Since the Controls were
derived from the most common attack patterns and were vetted across a
very broad community of government and industry, with very strong
consensus on the resulting set of controls, they serve as the basis for
immediate high-value action.195

Exhibit Three is “Critical Security Controls: Version 5.” More
information and a description regarding each of these component part
items may be found at the SANS Institute website.196
Exhibit Three:
SANS Critical Security Controls: Version 5
1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices
2: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software
3: Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on
Mobile Devices, Laptops, Workstations, and Servers
4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
5: Malware Defenses
6: Application Software Security
7: Wireless Access Control
8: Data Recovery Capability
9: Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to
Fill Gaps
10: Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as
Firewalls, Routers, and Switches
11: Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and
Services
12: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
13: Boundary Defense
14: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs
15: Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know
16: Account Monitoring and Control
17: Data Protection
18: Incident Response and Management

195.
196.

Id.
Id.
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19: Secure Network Engineering
20: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises
D. OWASP Top Ten
The Open Web Application Project (OWASP) is a world-wide
not-for-profit organization having a stated mission of making
“software security visible so that individuals and organizations
worldwide can make informed decisions about true software security
risks.”197 The OWASP website reports: eighty-seven chapters in the
United States; twelve in Canada; thirty-nine in Latin America; sixty in
Europe; sixty-one in Asia/Pacific/Middle East; sixteen in Africa; and
eight student chapters.198 The OWASP top ten has been translated into
many different languages and represents a broad consensus of OWASP
members about location of the most critical web application security
flaws and is depicted in Exhibit Four below.199
Exhibit Four:
Open Web Application Project (OWASP) Top 10 List, 2013
A1 Injection
A2 Broken Authentication and Session Management
A3 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
A4 Insecure Direct Object References
A5 Security Misconfiguration
A6 Sensitive Data Exposure
A7 Missing Function Level Access Control
A8 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
A9 Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
A10 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
Source: OWASP Top 10 – 2013
OWASP urges all organizations to “adopt this awareness
document within their organization and start the process of ensuring
that their web applications do not contain these flaws. Adopting the
197. See generally The Open Web Application Project, Welcome to OWASP,
http://bit.do/OpenWebAppProject.
198. The Open Web Application Project, OWASP Chapter, http://bit.do/OWASPChapter.
199. The Open Web Application Project, Category: OWASP Top Ten Project,
http://bit.do/OWASPTopTen.
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OWASP Top Ten is perhaps the most effective first step towards
changing the software development culture within your organization
into one that produces secure code.”200 Also available at the OWASP
website are a number of other valuable tools, including: OWASP
Mobile Top 10 Risks; OWASO Top 10 Cheat Sheet; Top 10 Proactive
Controls; and OWASP Top 10 Mapped to the Web Hacking Incident
Database.201
E. CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
Another source of useful threat assessment tools is The Common
Weakness Scoring System (CWSS).202 The CWSS “provides a
mechanism for prioritizing software weaknesses in a consistent,
flexible, open manner. It is a collaborative, community-based effort
that is addressing the needs of its stakeholders across government,
academia, and industry.”203 Often software developers “face hundreds
or thousands of individual bug reports for weaknesses that are
discovered in their code. In certain circumstances, a software weakness
can even lead to an exploitable vulnerability.”204 The CWSS reports
that:
Due to this high volume of reported weakness, stakeholders are often forced
to prioritize which issues they should investigate and fix first, often using
incomplete information. In short, people need to be able to reason and
communicate about the relative importance of different weaknesses. While
various scoring methods are used today, they are either ad hoc or
inappropriate for application to the still-imprecise evaluation of software
security.
Software developers, managers, testers, security vendors and service
suppliers, buyers, application vendors, and researchers must identify and
assess weaknesses in software that could manifest as vulnerabilities when
the software is used. They then need to be able to prioritize these
weaknesses and determine which to remediate based on which of them pose
the greatest risk. When there are so many weaknesses to fix, with each being
scored using different scales, and often operating with incomplete
information, the various community members, managers, testers, buyers,
and developers are left to their own methodologies to find some way of
comparing disparate weaknesses and translating them into actionable

200.
201.
202.
Scoring.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Common Weakness Scoring System, MITRE CORP., http://bit.do/CommonWeakness
Id.
Id.
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The CWSS offers quantitative measurements, a common
framework for prioritizing software application security weaknesses,
and the ability to customize priorities.206 Further, the CWSS “is
organized into three metric groups, with each group offering multiple
metrics: the base finding; attack surface; and environmental metric
groups.207 An attempt was made in the 2010 SANS/CWE Top 25 Most
Dangerous Errors list “to perform quantitative prioritization of CWE
entries using a combination of Prevalence and Importance, which
became the basis of CWSS 0.1 later in the year.”208 Forty-one candidate
weaknesses were rated by survey and used to generate a “Top 25” list.
In addition:
The 2010 Top 25 was structured in a way to support multiple points of view
that could reflect different prioritizations of the weaknesses. The creation
of separate focus profiles stemmed from some critiques of the original 2009
Top 25, in which a generalized Top 25 list would not necessarily be useful
to all audiences, and that a customized prioritization would be ideal. Eight
focus profiles were provided with the 2010 Top 25. For example, the
Educational Emphasis focus profile evaluated weaknesses that are regarded
as important from an educational perspective within a school or university
context. It emphasized the CWE entries that graduating students should
know, including weaknesses that were historically important or increased
the breadth of coverage. A separate focus profile ranked weaknesses based
solely on their evaluated Importance, which would be useful to software
customers who want the most serious issues removed, without
consideration for how frequently they occur or how resource-intensive it is
to fix. These ranking-oriented focus profiles made the Top 25 more useful
to certain audiences, and their construction and management have served as
a useful predecessor to CWSS and vignettes.209

F. U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)
The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) is
the 24-hour operational arm of the DHS National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). CERT is designed to
lead “efforts to improve the nation’s cybersecurity posture, coordinate
cyber information sharing, and proactively manage cyber risks to the
Nation while protecting the constitutional rights of Americans. USCERT strives to be a trusted global leader in cybersecurity—
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Common Weakness Scoring System, supra note 202, at 39.
Id.at 40.
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collaborative, agile, and responsive in a dynamic and complex
environment.”210 CERT describes its mission as follows:
Through its 24x7 operations center, US-CERT accepts, triages, and
collaboratively responds to incidents; provides technical assistance to
information system operators; and disseminates timely notifications
regarding current and potential security threats and vulnerabilities… USCERT leverages the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII)
Program to prevent inappropriate disclosure of proprietary information or
other sensitive data. Established in response to the Critical Infrastructure
Information Act of 2002 (CII Act), the PCII Program enables members of
the private sector to voluntarily submit confidential information regarding
the nation’s critical infrastructure to DHS with the assurance that the
information will be protected from public disclosure.211

Through its National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS), CERT is a
valuable source of information about cyber threats and software
vulnerability. In addition, it is an appropriate place to report breaches
and other related matters. Interested parties can find valuable cyber
information at the CERT website and subscribe to data feeds and
mailing lists.
G. Role and Value of Chief Information Security Officer
Information technology governance may benefit from the
presence of a skilled Chief Information Security Officer (CISO).
Professor Scott Shackelford says that “most would have thought that,
as a leading IT company, Sony would have had a senior manager
devoted to information security,”212
Yet when the company was hacked in April 2011, it did not have a Chief
Information Security Officer. Firms with a CISC (or equivalent title) have
been reported to experience fewer costs when a breach occurred: $157 per
record, versus $236 per record for firms without strategic security
leadership that is part of overall enterprise risk management.213

H. Ten Ways to Improve Cybersecurity
Pinguelo and Muller note that “although companies cannot
prevent all hacking incidents . . . relatively simple measures—

210. U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), About Us,
http://bit.do/ComputerEmergencyReadiness.
211. Id.
212. Shackelford, supra note 83, at 16.
213. Id. (citing Chris Costanzo, Is Your Company Prepared for Cyber Risk, (2011),
http://bit.do/CyberRiskInsurance; Denis Drouin, Cyber Risk Insurance: A Discourse and
Preparatory Guide, SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room (2004)).
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combined with diligent employee training, custom technology tools
tailored to a business’ needs, and through incident response planning—
can help improve a company’s cybersecurity and prepare it to respond
effectively to those incidents that do occur.”214 Elsewhere, I’ve cited a
useful list of ten measures to improve cybersecurity and response to
attacks provided by Pinguelo and Muller.215
Exhibit Five, created by the U.S. Department of the Treasury to
address the needs of commercial banks, is a list of ten questions any
enterprise can use to think about cybersecurity. While drafted to meet
the particular needs of banks, these questions may be tailored to fit the
needs of any line of business. Deputy Treasury Secretary Sarah Bloom
Raskin explains that “at Treasury we have framed our thinking about
cybersecurity and financial industry preparedness against cyber-attacks
around three categories of activities: (1) baseline protections, (2)
information sharing, and (3) response and recovery.”216
Exhibit Five:
U.S. Department of the Treasury’s
Ten Questions in Thinking About Cybersecurity
… baseline protections are the policies, procedures, and other controls that
[are] adopted to prevent penetration of their networks and systems, and to
prevent damage assuming that there has been access.
1. Is cyber risk part of our current risk management framework?
Banks should have risk management frameworks that are appropriately
tailored to the cyber risks presented by their specific businesses and
operations. Ideally, your cybersecurity risk management is part and parcel
of your enterprise risk management framework, key components of which
are technology, process, and people.
CEOs and boards of directors should identify the cyber threats presented by
their particular activities and operations and match those threats to
appropriate technology solutions. Then CEOs and boards should adopt
policies, procedures, and other controls—like training and governance—to
not only address identified cyber threats that their technology solutions
cannot control, but also to reasonably anticipate possible breakdowns and
overrides of that technology.
Finally, CEOs and boards should do their best to employ highly qualified
people to monitor and continually reassess the effectiveness of the deployed
technology and controls, including those technologies or controls which are
not directly operated by the institution. When appropriately designed and
executed, technology, process, and people form a risk management

214.
215.
216.

Pinguelo & Muller, supra note 80, at 85.
See Trautman, Triche & Wetherbe, supra note 184.
Raskin, supra note 34.
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structure and the necessary first lines of defense against cyber-attacks.
2. Do we follow the NIST Cybersecurity Framework? The National
Institute of Standards and Technology, or NIST… released the Framework
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity in February [2014]. The
NIST Cyber Framework is a well-considered approach to strengthening the
resilience of critical infrastructure. Banks should use the framework to
reduce cybersecurity threats both within the bank and with outside vendors.
The framework is a risk-based approach to managing cybersecurity that can
help identify your bank’s cyber posture and determine its risk profile and
tolerance. Importantly, the framework is not a technical document; it
focuses on oversight process for management and governance. For
example, it provides advice on how to develop organizational
communication plans for responding to attacks, and provides a common
language and set of practices, standards, and guidelines. And for
organizations that have developed enterprise-risk management approaches,
the NIST framework need not replace those approaches; instead the
framework can be used to better inform and apply those established riskmanagement approaches when the risks and associated controls are cyberrelated. The NIST framework also provides firms with a tool to evaluate
vendors and other third-parties that have access to their networks, systems,
and data…
3. Do we know the cyber risks that our vendors and third-party service
providers expose us to, and do we know the rigor of their cybersecurity
controls? Third-party vendors—and any other third parties with access to
a firm’s networks, systems, and data—can present a significant
cybersecurity hazard. As you know, given the nature of modern IT services,
many banks do not own or operate their systems for payment services or
other back-office processes. This means that personnel with access to your
networks, systems, and data may not even be employed by your bank.
As such, it is imperative that you understand the security safeguards that
your vendors and other relevant third-parties have in place. At a minimum,
this means four things: (1) knowing all vendors and third-parties with
access to your systems and data, (2) ensuring that those third parties have
appropriate protections to safeguard your systems and data, (3) conducting
ongoing monitoring to ensure adherence to protections, and (4)
documenting protections and related obligations in your contracts.
4. Do we have cyber risk insurance? And if we do, what does it cover
and exclude? Is our coverage adequate based on our cyber risk exposure?
While the cyber insurance market is relatively new, it is growing. More than
fifty carriers now offer some type of cyber insurance coverage.
Unlike the past, now some form of cyber coverage exists for organizations
of all sizes, from small, family-owned shops to Fortune 500 companies.
Policyholders can now find coverage to match a broad array of cyber risks,
ranging from liability and costs associated with data breaches to business
interruption losses and even tangible property damage caused by cyber
events.
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Cyber insurance cannot protect your institutions from a cyber incident any
more than flood insurance can save your house from a storm surge or D&O
insurance can prevent a lawsuit. But what cyber risk insurance can do is
provide some measure of financial support in case of a data breach or cyber
incident. And, significantly, cyber risk insurance and the associated
underwriting processes can also help bolster your other cybersecurity
controls. Qualifying for cyber risk insurance can provide useful information
for assessing your bank’s risk level and identifying cybersecurity tools and
best practices that you may be lacking.
I have been asking our insurance and cyber experts at Treasury to think
about how to encourage an environment where market forces create
insurance products that enhance cybersecurity for businesses. Ideally, we
can imagine the growth of the cyber insurance market as a mechanism that
bolsters cyber hygiene for banks across the board.
5. Do we engage in basic cyber hygiene? Here I am referring to ensuring
that your bank engages in fundamental practices to bolster the security and
resilience of your networks and systems. What exactly does this mean?
Things like: Knowing all the devices connected to your networks. Knowing
what is running—or attempting to run—on your networks. Knowing who
has administrative permissions to change, bypass, or override system
configurations and then reducing that number to only those who need those
privileges. And also: patching software on a timely basis, and conducting
continuous, automated vulnerability assessments and remediation. The
Center for Internet Security, working with others including the Department
of Homeland Security, launched the Cyber Hygiene Campaign in April
[2014]. By some estimates, engaging in basic cyber hygiene will prevent 80
percent of all known attacks. This is the basic “blocking and tackling” that
doesn’t take a computer wizard to understand.
Information Sharing
… By information sharing, I’m referring to the sharing of timely, actionable
information regarding cyber vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents with a
view toward limiting attacks and stopping contagion across systems,
networks, and other institutions. We know that the most effective defenses
do not happen in isolation. Instead, the banks most sophisticated in cyber
defense are those that play an active role in the information-sharing
community, which leads us to the sixth question you should be asking…
6. Do we share incident information with industry groups? If so, when
and how does this occur? When bad actors attack one bank, it is possible—
and increasingly likely—that those actors or others will use the same or
similar methods to target other institutions. We saw this play out earlier this
year during the attack on JP Morgan Chase’s systems. That attack was not
limited to JP Morgan Chase, but reportedly targeted other institutions as
well.
Sharing knowledge of vulnerabilities, threats, and incidents allows banks to
benefit from the experience of others. This benefit is more acute today,
when banks act as correspondents and comprise an interconnected system;
and when an intrusion at one bank may quickly enable an intrusion at
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another…
Response and Recovery
…Given the sheer number and continual morphing of assaults, we know
that a goal of avoiding every attack is currently “pie-in-the-sky,” so instead
we have to increasingly focus our efforts on making response and recovery
more efficient, effective, and predictable.
7. Do we have a cyber-incident playbook and who is the point person
for managing response and recovery? Whether it is a stand-alone
document or part of a larger business continuity and disaster recovery plan,
your bank should consider having a detailed, documented plan that
designates who is responsible for leading the response-and-recovery
efforts; and that individual, as well as the entire organization, should know
his or her authority. The person you choose to lead this effort should have
exceptional organizational and communication skills because he or she will
quarterback internal and external interactions.
8. What roles do senior leaders and the board play in managing and
overseeing the cyber incident response? The CEO and the board have to
understand what their respective roles will be in the event of a significant
cyber incident at the bank or in an adjacent sector such as energy or
telecommunications that might significantly affect the bank. This means
clearly understanding when and which matters get escalated to the CEO. It
also means understanding whether the full board or a committee—like risk
or audit—is initially tasked to oversee the response from a governance
perspective. Attacks can create confusion and fear, but the damage can be
vastly minimized if leaders clearly understand their roles in response and
attack mitigation.
To practice those roles, it makes sense for banks to participate in cyber
exercises that simulate a cyber intrusion. These exercises allow CEOs,
directors, and other key players to figure out how they will navigate the
pressures and problems that come from the intrusion.
The Treasury is developing an exercise regime designed to test
communication and decision-making during cyber incidents, an effort that
will involve institutions from across the financial sector as well as
departments and agencies throughout government. Likewise many trade
associations regularly organize cybersecurity exercises… Think of these
exercises as complicated fire drills; proactive engagement with regulators
and law enforcement through these exercises helps to better prepare your
banks for actual attacks.
9. When and how do we engage with law enforcement after a breach?
It is important to remember that most cybersecurity breaches are crimes,
some of which are crimes in progress. As such, your cyber-incident
playbook should contemplate when, based on the data gathered, you should
reach out to law enforcement. Because many of you may not have had
reason to reach out to federal law enforcement agencies who specialize in
cyber-crimes, we recommend that financial institution leaders—at banks of
all sizes—cultivate relationships with local U.S. Secret Service and FBI
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field offices. These teams are spread out across the country, and have
personnel dedicated to cybersecurity. This relationship-building should
start now if it hasn’t already, before a cyber event is unfolding. If you need
help making those connections, our team will facilitate those introductions.
10. After a cyber incident, when and how do we inform our customers,
investors, and the general public? Transparency is key. To instill trust
and confidence, the messages you communicate should avoid technical
jargon and legalese and provide clear and consistent information. In
addition, for those organizations that are public companies, you will have
additional considerations regarding the timing and content of your
disclosure if the breach is considered material information. These are some
reasons why having draft messages for various scenarios is an important
part of your bank’s playbook, given the possibility that events may be
serious and fast-moving.217

217.

Id.
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CONCLUSION
Now more than ever, governance of cybersecurity risk requires
continuous education and vigilance. In cyberspace, barbarians are
always at the gate. This article attempts to explore the unusually
complex subject of cybersecurity in a readable manner. Many of the
most significant cyber breaches to date and have been examined. Next,
recent governmental policy initiatives, including President Obama’s
Executive Order 13636 and related Treasury Department report, the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and NIST Framework have
been reviewed. Important tools are available to improve the quality of
discussion between boards, management, and information technology
executives: the SANS Critical Security Controls; OWASP Top Ten;
CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors; resources from
the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
Center (NCCIC) and U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (USCERT); and the U.S. Treasury’s list of ten ways to improve
cybersecurity. Hopefully, these suggestions about what top managers
and boards can do to improve cyber awareness and readiness will result
in meaningful progress toward strengthening cybersecurity
governance.

